In Nigeria, transit camps for jihadists and their ex-hostages

At first glance, the Hajj camp looks like any other camp for displaced people in northern Nigeria. Veiled women bustle about, men wait for time to pass, seated in front of endless rows of tents.

But the difference is size. Residents of the camp are either former jihadists, members of the Boko Haram or Islamic State in West Africa (Iswap) groups, or lived under their control.

In exchange for their freedom, the government convinced them to surrender, hoping to end a rebellion that has left tens of thousands dead and more than two million displaced since 2009.

But an AFP investigation reveals major flaws in the screening and deradicalization process. Authorities seized the major opportunity presented by the May 2021 death of historic Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in clashes with his Iswap rivals.

The government then decided to act quickly. Through leaflets dropped from helicopters over the forests, hideouts of the jihadists, the state of Borno makes them a promise: “We will not deliver you to the army. We will take care of you and your family in a camp in Maiduguri for four or five months, then you will be released”.

A strategy that paid off in many ways. Since 2021, more than 90,000 people affiliated with jihadist groups have surrendered. Most went through Hajj, some through other similar camps (Shokari and Bulumkutu).

Although the vast majority are not former combatants but rather families who lived under the yoke of the jihadists, these massive releases have nevertheless attracted the attention of international donors.

The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United Nations support the initiative – called the “Borno model” – and have pledged to help expand a program seen as a way to end conflict.

For several months, AFP – the first international media to gain access to the Hajj camp, the largest of the three centers – interviewed twelve former residents who requested anonymity, including ex-combatants, as well as two senior officials and humanitarian workers.

According to official documentation, there are elaborate processes to separate former jihadists from non-combatants, including through an “intensive process of identification and assessment of all individuals”.

But of the three veterans interviewed by AFP, only one said he was asked which fights he had taken part in and why.

As for women, automatically categorized as “wives”, no one asks them questions.

One of the three farmers interviewed, who lived under the yoke of Boko Haram, said his screening had been carried out by former fighters of the group, who were instructed by the authorities to nominate those they believed to be “one of the their”.

Community leaders and vigilante groups (CJTFs) are also involved in identifying individuals.

“There is corruption, because sometimes relatives come to give something to the CJTF so that they say they are not Boko Haram fighters,” said a former sharia judge under the jihadist group.

Retired General Abdullahi Sabi Ishaq, the governor’s special adviser for security affairs, however, assures that the program, including the screening, is “managed by professionals”.

“They take an oath, so if they lie, something can happen to them. Anyone who tries it is playing with fire,” he told AFP.

In theory, veterans stay a few months in the camps and those who were not combatants spend a few days there. Some residents get passes to move freely around town during the day.

Mr Ishaq says the former fighters undergo a two-week course, including lessons on “Islamic values” and “basic human rights”.

Before their release, the men must take an oath and swear that they will not return to the bush and that they will not spy on behalf of jihadist groups.

“Momo”, a veteran, was thirteen years old when he joined Boko Haram. Now 26, he says he took part in “numerous attacks” on soldiers and “unbelievers” to establish an “Islamic state” before surrendering.

During his five months at the Hajj camp, Momo says preachers came and said, “we should be patient with people when we go, we should be obedient with local authorities, and we should be serious about our religious duties.” .

This is the extent of the “deradicalization” process he says he went through.

Some non-combatants also hold radical beliefs and could have benefited from a deradicalization process.

The former judge, for example, spent years whipping those who did not follow his interpretation of Sharia and conditioned hundreds of children in his school for young jihadists.

This father of nine, who now lives free, says he would have liked to join Iswap if he could, instead of surrendering.

Saratu, a 20-year-old married to a senior Boko Haram commander, also seems to regret leaving the group, which she says “only kills drug addicts”.

Another motivating factor for defectors is that once they surrender, authorities give them money – monthly stipends and a lump sum when they leave – as well as food and basic necessities. .

Such a choice by the government arouses resentment among the inhabitants of Borno who have suffered for years from the conflict.

Because, if the experts insist on the importance of offering a way out to those who surrender, many believe that the victims deserve reparation.

“Serious crimes have been committed. Someone must be held accountable because without some form of justice, it is difficult to conceive how there can be a lasting peace”, underlines an international security expert under cover of the ‘anonymity.

Local authorities fear referring suspects to the federal level, where they typically end up behind bars for years in remand limbo.

In addition, their investigative capabilities are limited.

“What evidence do we have of who did what?” asks Mr. Ishaq. “The justice process will follow. We have to get to that stage, but let’s get everyone out first.”

With an expected budget of around 140 million euros, the government plans to build another center and three “integrated villages” where those who have surrendered could live temporarily before being reintegrated into communities.

“Maybe their plan will work,” says the security expert. But “if not, the risk is that you have violent ex-combatants on the loose who may return to criminal or terrorist activity.”

Two weeks after conducting the interviews, AFP received a phone call from a source. Saratu, the young woman married to a high-ranking Boko Haram commander, “returned to the bush with her children”.

Her husband’s unit has since been accused of slaughtering 37 fishermen last month near the town of Dikwa in northern Borno state.

04/11/2023 07:14:26 –         Maiduguri (Nigeria) (AFP) –         © 2023 AFP

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