Wagner, established in Sudan for years, enjoys privileged access to the country’s gold mines, but the Russian paramilitary group has been discreet since the start, on Saturday April 15, of clashes between the regular army and the very feared Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The African ambitions of the private military company (PMS) founded by Evgueni Prigojine, loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin, are unlimited, even if it intended to advance masked in certain territories. And there is no doubt that she intends to come out of the fighting unscathed.
Under the regime of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Russia was the only arms supplier to Sudan, under international embargo. In 2017, General Bashir promised the Russians a naval base on the Red Sea. She still hasn’t seen the light of day.
After the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Khartoum is moving away from Moscow. But in October 2021, the army commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, took power. Its number two, Mohammed Hamdane Daglo alias “Hemedti”, leader of the paramilitaries of the FSR, claims their proximity to the Russians: “If a country wants a base on our coasts, that this base satisfies our interests and does not threaten our security, that she’s Russian or whatever, we’ll cooperate,” he said.
Meanwhile, last February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Khartoum, as part of a trip to several African countries. Shortly after, two Sudanese ministers reported that the agreement to build the naval base was nearing completion.
Sudan is full of precious metal, of which it is the second largest producer in Africa, but the vast majority is exported illegally. Many mines are held by Hemedti’s FSRs.
Wagner acts through Yevgueni Prigojine’s M Invest company and its subsidiary Meroe Gold, which moved to Sudan in 2017. It works with the Aswar company, controlled by Sudanese military intelligence.
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) group of journalists established evidence of a contract between Meroe and Aswar. The Russian company is also exempted in 2018 from the 30% tax imposed by Sudanese law on gold companies.
Unlike in Mali or the Central African Republic (CAR), the group “has remained relatively opportunistic in Sudan rather than loyal to a particular faction”, explains to Agence France-Presse Catrina Doxee, of the American think tank CSIS. This allows it to continue to extract gold after the fall of Omar el-Bashir, then the coup of October 2021.
The situation is all the more conducive to clandestine agreements as Khartoum is under a series of sanctions and an arms embargo, imposed in 2005 by the UN during the bloody conflict in Darfur (west) and that the economy is devastated.
After the fall of Omar al-Bashir, Washington removes Sudan from its list of countries supporting terrorism in 2020. International aid resumes, but stops again following the coup. In 2020, the US Treasury also sanctions the two Wagner companies and their managers.
Yevgeny Prigozhin “and his network exploit Sudan’s natural resources for personal gain and to spread their influence,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said at the time.
Because it’s not just about gold. “Disinformation campaigns targeting Sudanese social media users have been an integral part of their tactics since 2017,” says a recent report by the NGO Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
Wagner excels in campaigns to destabilize and manipulate opinions through his “troll farms”. In early 2022, a member of the Sudanese security services told AFP that “Russian experts secure communications and analyze social networks for state-linked institutions”. The SMP also trains security services. “There is no doubt about the presence of Russian paramilitary personnel in Sudan,” Russian researcher Serguei Shukankin wrote in 2020 for the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI).
In February, in Sudan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov defended Wagner’s operations in Africa, “deployed at the request of governments” and “helping to normalize the situation in the region”.
What role does Wagner play in the fights between Burhane and Hemedti? “Today, not a single Wagner fighter is in Sudan,” Yevgeny Prigojine said on Telegram on Tuesday (April 18). “And it’s been like that for two years.”
Analysts agree, with some nuances, on a logical opportunism.
The Russians “are like the Emirates and the Chinese: as long as business continues and their influence remains, the best wins”, assures Roland Marchal, from Ceri in Paris.
The history of the links between Hemedti and Wagner could weigh, notes Colin Clarke, director of research at the Soufan Center in New York. “But as with any mercenary group, loyalty and allegiance goes to whoever signs the checks. »
Wagner has weathered a lot of bumps and “will probably be looking for ways to ride out the storm with his interests intact,” Catrina Doxee points out.
