Ukraine has put Russia’s troops on the defensive. Now Kiev’s army must retake as much territory as possible before the 250,000 new Russian soldiers are ready to fight, says military expert Gustav Gressel of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Again and again the Ukrainians would be slowed down: There is a lack of ammunition.
ntv.de: The way the bridges across the Dnipro look so destroyed today, it’s hard to believe that the Russian military leadership didn’t have to leave heavy equipment behind in Cherson.
Gustav Gressel: A lot of the equipment that didn’t make it across the river was destroyed. Some things are still relatively intact, but from a Russian point of view the most important thing militarily was and is the soldiers.
Because you need far fewer people on the south bank?
This frees up a lot of forces, but that applies to Ukraine as well. Seven Ukrainian brigades were deployed in this sector of the front, some of which can now be liberated and transferred to the Donbass. For Russia, the soldiers are even more relevant, because the personnel situation in the Russian troops is tighter. At the same time, mostly contract and professional soldiers fought in Cherson, i.e. units with combat experience that are needed for mobilization.
In what way?
The Russian military only has enough equipment, instructors, and barracks to train about 250,000 people at a time. If there are more, then you have to do it one after the other. And when Russia tackles the next wave of mobilizations, the question will be even more urgent than it is now: Who is leading it?
How far along is the military in training the current new recruits?
About 200,000 to 250,000 of the newly recruited young men are still in Russia, and the army is now forming units out of them. They are dressed in uniform and a Kalashnikov is hung around their neck. If the military trains people intensively in the 30 days it allocates for this, they are only teaching them the soldier’s trade in that time. But who will be the squad commander? Who will be the platoon commander? Who leads these new battalions?
The professionals from the front in Kherson.
Now if I pull 20,000 professional and regular soldiers there, all of whom have combat experience, I can use them as a cadre to lead the next wave of mobilization. The Russian supreme commander in Ukraine, Sergey Surovikin, was not the first high-ranking military man to call for a withdrawal from Kherson. His predecessor asked Putin to do the same, and he refused at the time – for political reasons. Surovikin got it through with the boss now.
What developments do you expect for the coming months?
The Russians will probably not be offensively ready until next spring, but they will be a little later. Originally there was talk of concentrating on the Donbass and then marching towards Odessa. That is why Moscow has held on to Cherson as a bridgehead for so long. For a march on Odessa, however, you need a crossing over the rivers – the Dnipro would be one, and the Bug would be the next.
Can the Russians avoid this?
It makes more sense for them to come from the north. From there they don’t have to cross the big rivers, and Moscow is already sending forces to Belarus for a northern offensive.
If the Russians remain on the defensive, where could Kyiv launch its next offensive?
I would guess south from Zaporizhia. In this way, the troops could break through to the Sea of ??Azov and separate the Russian units from one another. As long as the Crimean bridge is still badly damaged and supplies are faltering there, Kiev’s troops could try to get to Crimea from the east. The terrain there lends itself to an offensive, for there is no strong obstacle to protect the Russians. If Kyiv has enough ammunition and forces to move quickly, then I would expect an offensive there.
How could Kyiv continue to capitalize on a success there?
If the Ukrainian troops are able to cut off the land route to Crimea in this way, this again results in a front that can be well defended because the crossing to Crimea is a relatively small bottleneck. The Ukraine could hold that well against the Russian troops and then concentrate fully on the Donbass again.
Crimea itself would rather not be targeted by the Ukrainians?
Crimea would be very difficult from a Ukrainian point of view. They have no air supremacy and no air force to drop paratroopers in deep. They also have no naval supremacy and no navy that would make an amphibious landing possible. That means you would have to go through the narrow land connections that exist.
Two bridges and two miles of land to the west.
The Ukrainian troops would have to go through that, and the Russian military could very well anticipate and attack this movement. An offensive in Crimea would therefore be an enormously difficult act, and Kyiv would probably not take it upon itself as long as other fronts are still open.
So the tactic would be: not take Crimea, but separate it?
This could work if the Ukrainian troops themselves sit on this connecting piece of land and blow up the two bridges. Then the army is there in the south on a fairly short front line that can be well defended.
What will the first front winter look like?
I don’t think there will be a break in winter. The frozen ground makes winter quite a good time to attack. Most importantly, Ukraine must now gain as many meters as possible, before the large mobilized formations, which are currently still in Russia and are being trained, come into action. On the Ukrainian side, the lack of ammunition for Soviet calibers regularly hinders Ukrainian deposits more than the weather.
Is the supply situation that precarious?
The army also needs the Soviet calibers for the old battle tanks of Soviet design. Currently, she always has to wait until she has enough new ammo. Only then can the troops afford a further advance. Then they have to wait again.
I would have thought tactical considerations would determine the timing of offensives. In reality, the Ukrainians do not have enough ammunition?
Kyiv receives certain quotas of ammunition per week or month, depending on what has been manufactured. For some systems, however, nothing follows. During an offensive with main battle tanks, the troops shoot a lot and run out of ammunition quickly. If the troops were caught moving without ammunition, it would be fatal. Therefore, the moment ammunition runs low, they must fall back to a line they can defend well.
And then wait for deliveries?
The infantry holds the captured terrain but cannot advance any further. So the tanks retreat again and wait week after week for ammunition to arrive again from the factories in the west – in the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, or from anywhere in the world. Only then can they attack again. As long as Ukraine does not get Western-designed main battle tanks that can fire NATO ammunition, the ammunition problem will remain.
According to his own statement, President Selelnskyj already has victory in mind. Are you probably more reserved?
A certain euphoria is spreading in the West and many believe that the war will be over in two months. Unfortunately he is not. In my view, the war is still largely open. The upcoming winter is a preparatory phase for next year. Depending on how much terrain Ukraine can reclaim in the coming months, it will be in a good or bad position when Russia launches its next major offensive.
What will then be the decisive factors?
A lot will then also depend on how well Kiev’s troops are equipped with ammunition and how many mobile, powerful, armored formations they can oppose to the new Russian offensive. Will it survive the Russian offensive and can it then pick up again? All of this is possible if Western support remains closed. Then a victory for Ukraine would be far more likely than a Russian success. But there is still a great deal of work ahead of us.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Gustav Gressel