After notable progress, the offensive launched by the Somali government against the radical Islamists Chabab has stalled in recent months, raising questions about the capacity of the authorities to break the insurgency led for sixteen years by this group affiliated with Al-Qaeda .

Determined to wage “total war” against Al-Shabaab, the Somali government seized the opportunity of a revolt of local clans to launch an offensive in the center of the country in August 2022. Supported by the international community, the government essentially controls cities, including the capital, Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab remains entrenched in large areas of southern and central Somalia.

For six months, the army and clan militias – with air support from the African Union force (Atmis), the United States and Turkish drones – recaptured vast territories, seizing in particular Islamist strongholds in Adan Yabal and Harardhere (center). This progression then stalled, the Chabab taking advantage of the death in combat of a major commander of the offensive, the arrival of inexperienced troops and a lesser involvement of the clans, crucial players in the advance. of the first months.

To restart operations, President Hassan Cheikh Mohamoud traveled to the town of Dhusamareb, assuring on August 18 that Al-Shabab would be “eliminated from the entire country” by the end of the year. But on August 26, Somali forces suffered a crushing defeat in the town of Cowsweyne, in circumstances never made official. “There is no other place where government forces have suffered such losses,” recognized Hassan Cheikh Mohamoud a week later, without mentioning the toll. Different sources report several dozen, even more than a hundred, soldiers killed and a large quantity of equipment seized.

This rout, which revealed logistical and command flaws, marked a turning point. “The government response was so disorderly that other forces withdrew from several towns in protest. The morale of the troops was very low,” says a source familiar with security issues. Since then, the offensive has been at a standstill.

Government and Chabab are engaged in a communications war. No independent assessment is available. The government highlights the territories and the number of localities taken over. But “using territorial gains to measure success against Al-Shabaab is insufficient in a guerrilla-type war,” underlines Omar Mahmood, analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG).

The Islamist group, whose numbers were estimated at between 7,000 and 9,000 men by Atmis in 2022, has retained its strike force. Despite the offensive, “the group managed to accelerate the pace of its operations, in particular by carrying out complex attacks”, notes the UN group of experts for Somalia in its report for the first half of 2023. The experts noted recorded fourteen attacks of this type between January and August (compared to four in 2022), one of the most significant of which killed at least 54 Ugandan soldiers in May on an Atmis base in Bulo Marer.

Somali intelligence recently reported internal tensions within Chabab, between supporters of the “emir” Ahmed Diriye and one of his lieutenants, Mahad Karate. But “it is not confirmed” and “they are carrying out their offensives effectively, they are united on the battlefield,” notes Samira Gaid, executive director of the Hiraal Institute, a think tank specializing in questions of security, based in Mogadishu.

Despite the setbacks, the government is showing its determination to stay the course, with the objective of initiating a second phase in the south of the country, the historic stronghold of Al-Shabaab. But “a rushed second phase risks compromising the successes achieved so far,” UN experts warned. A redeployment towards the south of forces fighting in the center of the country “would probably leave the latter region vulnerable and without sufficient protection”, they estimate. “[Government] logic is that by dividing the fronts, Al-Shabaab will be weaker. But so will the government,” says Samira Gaid.

The military participation promised by neighbors Kenya, Ethiopia and Djiboutian in this second phase called “Operation Black Lion” remains uncertain. The difficulties of the Somali army have also led to the suspension of the process of withdrawal of more than 17,000 soldiers from Atmis, planned until the end of 2024. After 2,000 men at the end of June, 3,000 others were to leave the country at the end september.

The rainy season, from October to December, amplified by the El Niño meteorological phenomenon, “forces a pause,” notes Samira Gaid: “Shabab has time to recover, but the government also has the opportunity to reorganize and to develop an appropriate strategy to carry out its offensive. »