This putsch in Niger raises the question of the maintenance of Western cooperation with Niamey and raises fears of a phase of instability with a “risk of a security stall”, estimates Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa center at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI). ).
Question: Was the ongoing coup in Niger predictable?
Alain Antil: We knew that President Bazoum’s power was very fragile. His election was contested by the opposition. There have been one or even several putsch attempts in Niger since he came to power. And we knew that in the army a number of officers were quite unhappy with the situation.
Part of public opinion in Niger is at least as anti-French as in Burkina Faso and Mali. On the other hand, President Bazoum and the regime had, unlike his neighbours, opted for the Western option, with a security partnership with the French, strong support from the United States, a German and Italian military presence… the international community was at Niger’s bedside. But the partners remain helpless because we approach the question from an anti-terrorist point of view when we have very localized insurgencies, very rooted in the populations, which take on a community dimension.
What about continued cooperation with the West, as the country faces multiple security challenges?
The situation in Niger and in its environment is extremely worrying. The country is bordered by the Libyan chaos, Nigeria with Boko Haram and ISWAP, the north of Benin very strongly affected by jihadism and obviously Mali and Burkina Faso. It was a center of stability despite security problems on the territory, they were rather well contained geographically on the side of Lake Chad, on the other hand the threat tended to extend to the West.
But instability will reign with the establishment of new institutions, we can fear a security stall. This is what happened in Mali and Burkina Faso when juntas took over and ousted elected presidents. We will see fairly quickly what the options chosen by the junta are.
Among the possible scenarios is that the Nigerien officers in power do not have such good relations with the French in the future. But the Malian option of firing the entire international community and keeping the Wagner militia is not very effective. Niger also has Burkina Faso as a neighbor, which has chosen to rely on its own forces, and we cannot say that this is a great success.
What does France have to lose if Niger asks them to leave? Is it possible that the Nigerian junta will choose to ally with the Russians, like the Malians?
On this point, at this stage, it is too early to say. The Nigerian junta behind this coup is very composite. On the other hand, in Mali, as we know, putschist officers are Russophiles and Russian-speakers and have made their links profitable, particularly for arms deliveries and recourse to Wagner.
Regarding France, contrary to popular belief, economic and commercial relations between Niamey and Paris are extremely tenuous. In terms of uranium, over the last ten years, Niger has been France’s fifth-largest supplier; it is no longer Paris’s strategic partner as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, there are not many French companies left in Niger apart from Orano (ex-Areva).
The outstanding question is to know what will happen in terms of the very close military cooperation between the Nigerien and French forces. The country hosts at least 1,500 French soldiers who are fighting hard with the Nigerien armies on the Malian border. France has chosen to change its military approach, not to fight in place of the local army, but to support them, which has made it possible to push the problems outside the territory, particularly on the Malian side.
