In the Sahel, the increase in jihadist attacks undermines the propaganda of putschist regimes

More than 210 people killed in terrorist attacks in Niger since General Abdourahamane Tiani’s July 26 putsch; 4,100 in Burkina Faso since that of captain Ibrahim Traoré, in September 2022; nearly 5,000 in Mali since the coup of May 2021, which marked the coming to power of Colonel Assimi Goïta. The results of the NGO Armed Conflict Location

In the Sahel, the multiplication of attacks carried out by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda) and its competitor the Islamic State in the Sahel (EIS) brutally contradicts the putschists’ propaganda on the rise in power of their respective armies and confront them with their unkept promises. The three officers in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey had ousted their predecessors by denouncing their inadequacy in the fight against the jihadists. Since their arrival at the top of the State, it is clear that they have not done better than the civil or military powers they replaced.

In Niger, where the junta managed to obtain the withdrawal of the French army, with which it was leading the fight against armed Islamists, at least 60 soldiers, according to several sources, were killed on October 2 in the Tahoua region ( center) by the EIS. In Mali, where the transitional government launched an offensive in August against former separatist rebels based in the north of the country, army positions are subject to GSIM attacks every week. Latest: October 4 and 6 in the vicinity of Tabankort and Anéfis, at the gates of the Kidal region, where, according to a press release from the jihadist group, “a certain number” of members of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and their allies from the Wagner paramilitary group were killed in two explosive attacks.

The Liptako-Gourma charter

Burkina Faso, which enlisted tens of thousands of auxiliaries, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP), has managed neither to regain territories lost to the jihadists, nor to stabilize the situation in Ouagadougou, where the Captain Ibrahim Traoré is contested within the ranks, as evidenced by the recent arrests of several officers suspected of fomenting a coup d’état. One of them was even fatal: on October 8, Commander Ismaël Touhogobou was killed at his home in the capital, following an “arrest that allegedly went wrong,” according to the military prosecutor’s office.

If the putschist regimes avoid communicating on military and civilian losses, they have more publicized the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which they formed on September 16 with the aim of “establishing an architecture of collective defense and mutual assistance”. Through their pact, formulated in the Liptako-Gourma charter, the three transitional presidents committed to jointly leading the fight “against terrorism in all its forms”. Since then, their cooperation has taken shape. On September 24, Burkina Faso state television reported “perfect coordination” between “Burkina Faso attack helicopters and Nigerien [air] vectors,” having made it possible to “annihilate a jihadist column” of more than 100 motorbikes along the Nigerien border.

The stated ambition is clear but, according to several observers, the real objective lies elsewhere. “Even if the juntas have an interest in highlighting their security cooperation and their progress in this sector, because their legitimacy depends on it, the AES has a more political aim than a security one,” believes Sahel specialist Anne Savey. According to her, the three juntas seek above all, in a context of regional pressures, to “show ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] that they will be united and stand up against its decisions, in being able to find solutions to counter them.”

Circumvent ECOWAS sanctions

By signing the Liptako-Gourma charter, the three military regimes committed to “not blockading ports, roads, coasts or strategic infrastructure”. A promise intended to circumvent the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS worried about the succession of coups d’état in the region.

If the Burkinabé Prime Minister, Apollinaire Kyélem de Tambèla, had already mentioned at the start of the year his desire to create a “flexible federation” with Mali, the threat of a military intervention by ECOWAS in Niger, after the coup State of July 26 and the sequestration of President Mohamed Bazoum, seems to have accelerated the process of union. Bamako and Ouagadougou had warned in early August that a regional intervention would constitute for them “a declaration of war” and would lead to their withdrawal from ECOWAS.

As part of this diplomatic rapprochement, Nigerien Prime Minister Lamine Zeine visited Mali and Burkina Faso from October 5 to 7, notably enabling an agreement with Bamako to supply Niamey with basic necessities. At the end of this trip, the civilian face of the Nigerien junta solemnly declared that Niamey “will never forget the commitment of Mali and Burkina Faso to its side following the illegal and illegitimate sanctions of ECOWAS and the desires of ‘aggression by proxy of the sub-regional organization’.