Former French Ambassador to India (1996-2000), Claude Blanchemaison is the author of L’Inde, contre vents et tides (Editions Temporis, 2021). A country he always talks about with a hint of nostalgia. On the occasion of the visit to Paris of the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, guest of honor of the military parade of July 14, the seasoned diplomat analyzes the springs which move this giant so little known.
Le Point: What are the objectives of Narendra Modi’s visit to France?
Claude Blanchemaison: This visit is part of a strategic partnership which is the culmination of a long history. General de Gaulle delegates relations with India to André Malraux. This was therefore first and foremost of a cultural nature. The following presidents are interested in the economic importance of this huge developing country. In 1996, the year in which I was appointed ambassador, President Jacques Chirac decided that France needed a strategic partner in the Indian Ocean and that this could only be India, while we were also maintaining links, including military, with Pakistan. Jacques Chirac, traveling in 1998 for a state visit, then proposed a strategic partnership between our two countries. Today we celebrate 25 years.
Is this partnership geopolitical, economic, cultural?
All at once! The cultural base of Malraux’s time remains very important. You have to be interested in Indian cinema and the immense Indian literature. We must increase student and researcher exchanges. The economic issue is of course topical. India is seeking to diversify its arms suppliers. We are part of it – Mirage, Rafale and Scorpene submarines.
You mention in your book the “discreet charm of French counters”. In fact, France and India have a long common history…
Pondicherry attracts Indian tourists, who find a certain French flavor there: the restaurants, the red caps of the police… We also have the French Institute of Pondicherry, which depends on the CNRS, and a branch of the French school of Extreme- East. We must neither dismiss this story nor sink into the nostalgia of counters. We want a modern relationship with India, a country with two Silicon Valleys, Bangalore and Hyderabad.
André Malraux saw in India a “synthesis between the religious philosophy of multiple gods and scientific rationality”. Is this a good definition of the Indian soul?
Yes ! Our reading grids are difficult to apply to this country so different from Europe, despite the traces left by the British, such as the presence of clubs. Educated, open-minded Indians like to discuss everything. India’s ability to integrate external contributions is colossal: the Mongolian contribution – therefore Muslim -, the British contribution… Its strength is to have been, until recently, tolerant. About 80% of Indians are Hindus, with Hinduism denoting a religious philosophy rather than a religion per se. There is no hierarchy, no Church, no pope, it is very different from our monotheistic religions. The country has 18% Muslims. The wound of the 1947 partition with Pakistan is not completely healed. The status of Kashmir [Himalayan region with a Muslim majority claimed by India and Pakistan, editor’s note] is still not settled. Its constitutional status was revoked in 2019 to make it two union territories, directly administered by Delhi. The nationalist party BJP [Indian People’s Party, editor’s note], in power since 2014, promotes an Indian identity primarily based on Hinduism, and tends to discriminate against other religions.
How to explain Modi’s popularity?
First by his charisma, his way of life, quite modest and austere. Then, he has almost no opposition. Unfortunately for Indian democracy, the Congress party [party of Nehru and Gandhi, kingpin of Indian independence, editor’s note] has fallen into disrepair, after having been in power from 2004 to 2014, and is looking for a real leader, capable to match Modi, who is skilful and efficient. In domestic politics, he can be intransigent, even brutal, but vis-à-vis his external interlocutors, he knows how to deceive and appear very open. We have just seen him with his triumphant trip to the United States, which presents itself as the leader of democratic countries.
Exactly, is India a full-fledged democracy?
In any case, we see the external signs of democracy, since alternations take place, at the level of the federation and in the twenty-eight Indian states, which are not all governed by the BJP. Modi has a good chance of being re-elected in the 2024 federal elections, since the economy is doing well, the crisis born of the Covid is overcome, and there is no real alternative. But, after this additional term, the question of succession will arise.
How does Modi’s national-populism differ from that of Xi Jinping, Donald Trump or even Erdogan?
The situation is radically different in China, a country dominated by a single party. On the other hand, we can allow ourselves a comparison with Erdogan, populist and authoritarian. But I believe Modi’s way of governing is uniquely Indian. He wants to give India an identity that is not that of the colonizers: the Mongols – whom he equates with Muslims – or the British. The brutalities and pogroms suffered by Muslims are of course intolerable, but some of them are well integrated into Indian society. India, with 1.408 billion people, poses a systemic challenge to China: it shows that a single party is not essential to run a huge country. It is a counter-model, with a market economy. But it must emphasize its capacity for integration, rather than exclusion of external contributions. That said, the Red Fort is where Modi holds his Independence Day speeches from every year: it is a Muslim monument.
Is the tension with China, with which India disputes part of the Himalayan border, likely to increase in the years to come?
In Asia, we are not necessarily allies or enemies: we can cooperate on certain subjects and fight each other on others. India and China cooperate technically and economically. Border disputes remain in the Himalayas, but they remain under control. In Kashmir, to the west, they relate to territories that China considers to belong to the Tibetan plateau. On a good part of this border, Chinese and Indians have decided that their patrols will not be armed. There are all the same fights, with bare hands, with stakes, and which sometimes end in deaths: about twenty Indian soldiers in the spring of 2020. I don’t know if such restraint would be possible in Europe… Well, China claims in the east, since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. But it is rather a means of pressure than a claim with immediate effect. The two countries refuse that others get involved in this border conflict.
China has developed what the Indians call the “pearl necklace” policy: the installation of naval bases around the country (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, etc.). Faced with this pressure, India is gradually acquiring a navy, with submarines, frigates and aircraft carriers.
Can India, Russia’s historic partner, swing the war in Ukraine?
The opinion of the “Global South”, including the Brics [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, editor’s note], will eventually weigh. This conflict, limited to Ukrainian territory in terms of armed operations, is globalized, since it disrupts supply chains and weighs on the prices of raw materials… If they do not want to antagonize Moscow, Indians and Chinese consider this war as a strategic error. They will live with a weakened Russia, but do not want to see it implode. At the military level, Russia is a historical partner, but India is rapidly diversifying.
What are the main challenges India faces?
Education. Every year, 10 to 12 million young people, many of whom have little or no education, enter the labor market. Health is another building site. Today, it works at two speeds: the rich can resort to private hospitals while the public sector is almost everywhere in bad shape.
