Six experts on six questions: after 100 days of war: how much longer can Ukraine hold out?

Day 100 of the war for Ukraine. Who would have thought on February 24 that the militarily weaker country could withstand the Russian attack for so long? With six questions to six experts, ntv.de takes a look at the prospects for Ukraine.

100 days are done, but how much longer can Ukraine hold out in this war?

Markus Kaim: That will be decided within the next six to eight weeks. The Western secret services assume that by this time the weapons of Russian and Soviet origin that Ukraine currently has will be used up and broken – meaning they will no longer be usable. Then the debate that we are already having will intensify: are we prepared to supply western arms? Judging by this Western reaction, the war will develop. If we pull back, it can be over quickly. If the west delivers extensively, it can take longer.

Julia Friedrich: Compared to the initial phase, there are fewer front lines and the areas in the Donbass are only changing control very slowly. Simply put, Ukraine’s main shortage is ammunition, weapons and fuel; and Russia mainly to soldiers. This does not mean, however, that defeat is immanent for either side: this war is dynamic. At the same time, it is clear that without arms supplies from the West, Ukrainian troops cannot defend – let alone recapture – their territory indefinitely.

Christian Mölling: As long as the West supports Ukraine militarily and Ukraine decides politically to keep fighting.

Stefan Meister: Ukraine will have to endure the war for a long time because it will not end in the foreseeable future. Even if there is a ceasefire after Russia’s conquest of the Donbass, Ukraine will be drawn into a “low intensive war” that it must continue to endure. It can only do this if it gets weapons and funding from Western countries on a permanent basis. But since, in principle, the entire population is fighting against Russia, it will be difficult for Russia to actually win this war.

Susann Worschech: At the moment, Ukraine’s strategy of targeting the weak points of the Russian invasion seems very reasonable to me. What is needed for Ukraine to win are a lot of heavy anti-aircraft weapons, so that Ukraine can enforce the no-fly zone over its territory itself, support from the West in reconnaissance, armored vehicles and other material, of course, but especially a consistent policy towards Russia.

Johannes Varwick: The question is: What does perseverance mean? The answer depends heavily on Russia’s war aims, which we cannot unequivocally assess. The Donbass does not seem to be tenable, and if Russia then wants to use all its military power to take Odessa and other parts as far as Moldova, then that should also succeed. The question is rather what losses Ukraine is willing to take and what weapons the West is supplying to counter Russian aggression.

Does the West have to keep a “face-saving way out” open to Putin in its own interest?

John Varwick: Yes. However, this question is largely taboo in Western discourse. But that is a serious mistake, because the attempt must still be made to negotiate a ceasefire: and that is only possible if Russia achieves some of its war goals. This is bitter for Ukraine and also very unpopular, but further escalation would be even more bitter.

Susann Worschech: No, on the contrary. The West has turned a blind eye to Putin’s wars in Chechnya and Georgia and has offered Putin one “face-saving solution” after the other on a silver platter since the annexation of Crimea – in vain. Putin sees this type of diplomacy as a direct request to intensify his imperialist policies. Any kind of “victory” that Putin could present to his society would represent an even greater danger for all of Europe, because on this basis the Russian military would be reorganized and equipped for the next deployments in two or five years.

Christian Mölling: No, the West cannot do this either. Putin wants to keep destroying Ukraine. He doesn’t care how long it takes or how much blood his country pays for it. Hesitation and phone calls are interpreted as fear in the West and exploited in the media in Russia. The west is led through the arena on the ring.

Stefan Meister: There is no face-saving way out of this war. If Putin wins it, other states in Europe will be in danger. We will always have to adapt to arming Ukraine, making it resilient to Russian attacks, and funding it. Russia will eventually run out of resources for this war, it is already so weak militarily that it is concentrating on the Donbass and no longer on all of Ukraine.

Markus Kaim: The term leads to the sidelines. We have to face a painful perspective: precisely because Putin started the war, we need him to end it. Nobody knows when and in what form this will happen. But at the moment there is no way around including Russia. This says nothing about the question of who wins or loses, but about the fact that we will not be able to avoid winning over President Putin to end the war.

Julia Friedrich: I see no reason for the West to adopt Vladimir Putin’s concerns. At present there are no signs that the Russian President is seeking any solution other than a military solution to the conflict with Ukraine. If he’s willing to seek a diplomatic solution that saves face, he’ll make that clear. This is the time to think about it, not before. A willingness on the part of Putin to stop his war of aggression can currently only be produced militarily by the Ukrainians.

How likely do you think the scenario of a Third World War is?

Julia Friedrich: At the moment I don’t think it’s very likely because Russia has tied up substantial parts of its military forces in Ukraine. Of course, it cannot be completely ruled out. It is therefore important, both militarily and politically, to back the Baltic States and Poland, which would be the first to be affected by an escalation of the war. The sense of threat and the view of the Ukraine war are different in these countries – Germany should respect that.

Christian Mölling: Extremely unlikely. Moscow cleverly planted this vision in the German debate, and now politicians and society are working on it. But it is a smokescreen. A very long war that lasts not just 100 but 200, 300 or 600 days is much more likely – Berlin must find answers to this: How will we support the Ukraine in good time and in the long term?

Johannes Varwick: Unlikely, but not impossible. In any case, it is still a ride on the razor blade to say on the one hand that one does not want to become a party to the war, but on the other hand to want to massively weaken Russia and inflict massive losses on it in Ukraine. The question is: will Russia put up with this in the long run or can it end in war with Russia after all? That would be World War III.

Susann Worschech: Not very likely at the moment, because the Russian military is already at the limit of its capabilities in the current war situation. What I think is conceivable would be the use of small nuclear weapons, so-called mini-nukes, in Ukraine if the West does not help more quickly. Or a kind of “extended suicide” by Putin, i.e. a nuclear strike before he or the Russian numenklatura kill themselves. I assume that this scenario is on the radar of the strategy offices in the West.

Markus Kaim: If there’s one thing we’ve seen in the last 100 days of war, it’s how both sides are careful to limit the dimension of the proxy conflict. Both are ready to carry out a conflict between the USA, NATO, the West on the one hand and Russia on the other on Ukrainian soil. At the same time, however, they are scrupulously careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the danger of an escalation.

Stefan Meister: Very unlikely. Should Russia use a tactical nuclear weapon, the entire world would turn against the country. It would be a “game changer” and a dangerous precedent that is unacceptable, even for countries like China. Russia has no interest in a major war with NATO because it cannot win it. It rhetorically plays on the subject to instill fear in our societies.

In the US, the political balance of power could change in the midterm elections. What consequences would a Republican victory have for the western position towards Russia?

Susann Worschech: An election victory for the Republicans would of course greatly weaken President Biden, both in practical terms when it comes to relevant decisions and in terms of legitimacy. As long as the Republicans remain in a pro-Trump camp, they pose a significant obstacle to international cooperation.

Stefan Meister: Not a big impact as there is a consensus between Democrats and Republicans in support of Ukraine. Republicans have even increased the budget for Ukraine and arms sales, and also aim to weaken Russia as much as possible.

Johannes Varwick: That is unclear today. Joe Biden is unlikely to fundamentally change his position, but there may be some pressure to find compromises with Russia. What a new president will do in 2024 is another matter.

Julia Friedrich: My impression is that the Midterms are not necessarily questioning the support for Ukraine at the moment, since the previous decisions on Ukraine have also received support from the Republican side. A more restricted room for maneuver for the American president would still not be good news.

Markus Kaim: I don’t see a problem there because we’ve seen something unusual in the US in recent months: Congress has rallied behind the presidents, despite the polarization of the US political system. That’s very unusual. I therefore do not see any effects of a changed Congress majority on this question.

Is the federal government doing enough to help Ukraine militarily?

Christian Molling: No. It is true that the parties that support the federal government have made enormous strides. But the more important question is: Does this help Ukraine in its struggle for itself and for European values? After a first wave of rocket-propelled grenades, etc., this aid came to a standstill. Either because no plan has been made to help Ukraine, or because the political balance of power is fragile.

Susann Worschech: With the announcement to supply the IRIS air defense system, a very important request from Ukraine has finally been accepted. So far, however, the federal government has stuck to its announcements, which all came much too late. If IRIS had been confirmed in March, there could already be appropriate training on it. So Germany simply delivers far too late.

Markus Kaim: If you measure the aid provided by gross domestic product, then six countries stand out: the three Baltic countries, Poland, Great Britain and the USA. Germany is in the lower midfield. You can say that Germany doesn’t have to hide behind others – that’s true. But others do more – that’s true too. I’m missing a bit of a goal: what do we want to achieve with our help? It’s so hyped up. At the moment, the position of the federal government is reasonably comfortable because Ukraine is not in danger of winning. It would be less pleasant if it gained the military upper hand and stood on the threshold of Crimea or Donbass. Then you would have to say whether you are still supporting Ukraine.

Johannes Varwick: The government is trying to swim with the convoy of its partners and is doing a great deal, including in the area of ??arms deliveries. At the same time, one has the impression that one should rather wear them for hunting, and one can speculate why that is. I suspect that the fear of an escalation of the situation is more present here than in the USA or other countries.

Stefan Meister: No, it doesn’t. In the long term, it must help introduce Ukraine to Western weapon systems and enable German industry to supply more tanks and modern weapons. It is still too reactive and needs a strategy of long-term military support for Ukraine.

Julia Friedrich: This question is difficult to answer because there is currently a great deal of uncertainty as to what Germany is actually doing or what it could do. In this respect, it would be desirable for the federal government to communicate more clearly what is being done, what is not, and for what reasons. It should also be ensured that Ukraine can be supported militarily in the long term. Therefore, a conversion to Western weapon systems will have to come sooner or later. The earlier you start training for it, the better. In general, the federal government has so far found it difficult to become active instead of reacting. Some of the frustration stems not only from the fact that the right weapon systems are not in place quickly enough, but also from the sense of directionlessness that arises, for example, from the previous refusal to formulate clear political goals in this war.

(How soon) should Ukraine join the EU after the war?

Stefan Meister: Ukraine should be given candidate status without a fast track. It should be by the rules, it will take years, but there should now be a signal that it is no longer part of the EU’s neighborhood policy, but part of the enlargement policy.

Markus Kaim: Even if I would be happy if Ukraine took the political path to the West: EU membership would be the tenth of our problems solved before the first. I don’t see how joining the EU should help in this major regulatory conflict that we are currently in with Russia, and the fault line of which runs right through Ukraine. The tectonic plates between east and west are meeting in Ukraine, which is why a volcano is erupting there. I don’t see which of these problems we are getting rid of by giving Ukraine EU member status.

Julia Friedrich: From a normative point of view, Ukraine should become a member of the EU, and soon. In practical terms, there are a number of obstacles in the way – war is one thing, unfinished reforms, particularly in the rule of law, are another. With regard to reforms, joint work on Ukraine’s membership is an important tool for the EU to strengthen democratic forces there that are willing to reform. In order to maintain this influence and to develop future prospects with Ukraine, it should be given candidate status.

Johannes Varwick: That’s not on the agenda at all today, even if many say otherwise. If the EU sticks to a criteria-based enlargement policy, it will take decades before Ukraine and the EU are ready for membership. Things would look different if Ukraine were tied more closely without full membership. Macron also has such a solution in mind: the old EU around Germany and France is radically deepening into a core Europe and building a new union around it, which then works together rather loosely politically. Ukraine could also take part in this.

Christian Mölling: A “membership without voting rights” model should be developed for the Ukraine and other countries. This is how we get out of the negatively connoted image of accession candidate status and can protect and support important states that are threatened by Russian influence.

Susann Worschech: Rapid accession would be vital for Ukraine’s survival, so it should be examined whether it can join even if its territorial integrity has not yet been restored, i.e. if Donbass, southern Ukraine and Crimea are still occupied by Russia . So far, that would have been an exclusion criterion. Because of the war, Ukraine will not reach important economic indicators anytime soon. However, a vulnerable Ukraine that is always easy for Russia to attack will ultimately cost the EU more than an economically weak but pacified Ukraine. The accession process must therefore be tackled quickly now.

Frauke Niemeyer spoke to the experts