Cheap but deadly: That's how dangerous Iranian kamikaze drones are

Russia is increasingly attacking Ukraine with Iranian kamikaze drones, primarily cities, but military positions are also targets. How dangerous are the drones and how can they be fought?

In the past few days, Ukraine has repeatedly reported Russian attacks using Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. Apparently, the port city of Odessa in particular is a target, at least two people have died there so far as a result of the attacks. However, the Ukrainian military also reports losses of guns, armored vehicles and other military equipment. Kyiv has recognized the threat and is working on countermeasures. What could these look like and how great is the danger actually posed by the drones?

According to the Military Factory, they are unmanned missiles equipped with warheads designed to neutralize ground targets from a distance. Because they often initially circle around in the target area and wait for a specific target to be assigned, they are also called “Loitering Munition” (“lurking weapons”).

The Shahed-136 is a delta wing aircraft with a warhead in its nose. It is powered by a propeller in the rear, but is assisted for launch by a rocket, which the drone ejects shortly thereafter. The cradle can hold and launch multiple Shahed-136s and is light and compact enough to fit on standard trucks.

The “Military Watch Magazine” calls the Kamikaze drones a mixture of cruise missile and unmanned aircraft. They are significantly cheaper than other long-range guided missiles, which Russia has already largely used up.

Oleg Katkov, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian portal Defense Express, explains how inexpensive production is. There was no video camera or other sensor on the drone, he told The New Voice Of Ukraine magazine. He therefore assumes that satellite navigation is the only source of orientation.

Since Iran is under severe sanctions and does not have access to a military GPS, the Shahed-136 is guided by an ordinary civilian GPS sensor that can be bought on AliExpress. The engine is also available from the Chinese online retailer.

According to the Ukrainian military service provider Defense Express, the Russians are also using a smaller variant of the Iranian kamikaze drone, the Shahed-131. This has already been disassembled and analyzed by experts. Among other things, it turned out that the drone’s control unit consists of five circuit boards, which are equipped with freely available processors from the US manufacturer Texas Instruments.

An “unpleasant surprise” was that a device had been found that prevented the GPS signal from being manipulated. However, the drone is not armed against jammers. If GPS fails because of this, the Shahed-131 will be kept approximately on course and altitude by a “primitive inertial system”.

Based on Iranian information, the larger kamikaze drone has a wingspan of 2.5 to 3.5 meters. According to Oleg Katkow, their maximum take-off weight is 200 kilograms. It follows that the warhead could weigh 50 to 60 kilograms. He does not believe the range of 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers specified by Iran. The aircraft would have to be bigger and heavier, “and its engine would not be a 50-horsepower moped engine.” Katkow therefore estimates the range at “a maximum of several hundred flight kilometers”.

According to “Defense Express”, the Shahed-131 is slightly smaller and has a wingspan of about 2.2 meters. The maximum launch weight is estimated at 135 kilograms, the weight of the warhead at 10 to 15 kilograms. The range should be up to 900 kilometers.

There is “a high probability that the Iranian drone was assembled from electronic components that are available on the market,” says Katkow. According to Defense Express, this means there is a risk that the Russians will mass-produce such kamikaze drones based on the Iranian model, despite sanctions.

If the drones are actually navigating exclusively via GPS, Katkow assumes that they will be relatively easy to get off track. Jammers, which you can also get from AliExpress, would be sufficient for this, he says. “Defense Express” also points out that only immovable targets can be attacked with GPS. Other countermeasures could include camouflage, disinformation, and deception.

To compensate for the lack of reliability and accuracy of the Shahed drones, they would be deployed as a swarm, the military expert said. Five to six or even more would be fired at a target in hopes of hitting some. In a mass deployment, it is difficult for any air defense system to shoot down the kamikaze drones as a small target at low altitude. According to the organization Ukrainian Military Center, a Shahed-136 flies at an altitude of 60 to 4000 meters at a speed of about 180 kilometers per hour.

The Ukrainians have recently proven on several occasions that it is possible to bring down the drones from the sky. Your air force reported seven kills on Facebook in the past 24 hours alone. According to one of the reports, more and more experience is being gained in destroying kamikaze drones, and effective countermeasures are being sought. On Monday, according to Reuters, President Zelenskyy met with army chief Valery Zalushnyy, his military intelligence chief, the defense minister and various other senior security and military officials to discuss solutions.

While anti-aircraft missiles can be used effectively against the drones, it would not be efficient. Katkow explains that it is simply unprofitable to shoot down a drone assembled with AliExpress components with a missile that can cost from $300,000. In addition, the resources of material are far too scarce.

British military expert Justin Bronk wrote on Twitter that because they flew so slowly and low, the kamikaze drones could be shot down comparatively easily with old-fashioned anti-aircraft radar guns like the German Gepard. But here, too, the resources are limited, according to “Defense Express”.

All experts consider laser-based defense systems to be an effective means. But they are still being produced in too small quantities, says Katkow. “First of all, Israel has such a system, the Iron Beam air defense system. The United States has experimental pre-production samples, and Turkey has the Alka laser complex.”

According to Katkow, whether the Iranian drones can decisively change the course of the war depends on their quantity and when they are delivered. He currently estimates their number at a few hundred to 1,000. But if these prove effective, Russia could order larger quantities or start its own production.