The chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, Michael Roth, calls for a European security order that is geared towards Russia. There can be no peace with Russia at the moment. In an interview with ntv.de, the SPD politician calls for more self-confidence in dealing with the “tired, tottering colossus” Russia and is currently warning of a ceasefire. Ukraine now needs more weapons, also to recapture areas occupied by Russia. Despite all the criticism, Roth shows respect and recognition to the Ukrainian Ambassador Melnyk.
ntv.de: You wrote in a guest article for a German Sunday newspaper that security in Europe can only exist against Russia, not with Russia. This means a reversal of the previous foreign policy line of the SPD and the federal government.
Michael Roth: This is not a new finding, but it has become mandatory for all of us since February 24 at the latest. The brutal Russian war of aggression against Ukraine shook us awake. We must build a new order of peace and security in Europe, not only without Russia, but also against Russia. In its new strategic concept, NATO recently rightly stated that the greatest and most immediate threat to peace, security and stability in Europe and the world comes from Russia. We all have to learn to deal with that.
What follows from this front position politically, economically and militarily?
With the special fund of over 100 billion euros, we are strengthening the Bundeswehr, which also benefits our NATO partners. That was a long overdue step, also to finally clear up the omissions of the past. Because if we had better equipped our Bundeswehr much earlier, we would not be left completely blank in many areas today and could provide the Ukraine with more military equipment from our own stocks. We must also recognize that we must never again turn a cold shoulder to the security needs of our Central and Eastern European partners, such as Poland and the Baltic States. And we will also have to do more in the EU and in the European part of NATO to ensure our security. But that does not mean that we want to detach ourselves from the United States.
So no greater detachment from the US, which we don’t know if President Biden will be succeeded by an unreliable populist?
No, precisely because our Central and Eastern European partners cannot imagine security without a strong USA. We have to take that into account. Greater European sovereignty in defense policy must not encourage the USA to withdraw from Europe, on the contrary. The Europeans simply could not guarantee their own security without the USA in the foreseeable future. You have to balance that so bitterly. The EU must become stronger, but NATO cannot and should not replace it. Nevertheless, we must take more responsibility for our own interests, and we are in the process of doing so now that the EU has initiated the accession process for Ukraine and Moldova. The opening of the EU to Eastern Europe was a taboo for a long time. We’ve taken a huge step forward there. In the Western Balkans, too, we must finally implement the promise of accession. If we leave a political vacuum in these regions, other powers like China, Turkey and Russia will ruthlessly take advantage of it.
However, the accession procedures in the Balkan countries are stalling, also because applicants and candidates are having problems meeting the accession criteria in the foreseeable future. If we still want to quickly bind these neighbors to the EU, do we perhaps have to lower the preconditions?
When it comes to democracy, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and an independent judiciary, I am not inclined to compromise formulas, on the contrary. But the way you say it isn’t true either. North Macedonia and Albania, for example, have long since met the criteria for starting accession negotiations following comprehensive reforms. But with Bulgaria, only one country is blockading and is thus taking the entire EU hostage. Visa liberalization for Kosovo also fails because of the reservations of a few member states. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the problems are in the country, the EU should have done a lot more.
Back to Russia and your guest post: Do you want to raise awareness among people that we are again in a permanent conflict with Russia, like in the Cold War?
First of all, we need to be aware that peace cannot be taken for granted, that we have to work hard and tirelessly for peace. There is no peace at the moment. There is not only a bloody war raging against Ukraine, but a war against our values ??and against all of Europe. Putin has been waging psychological warfare against the West, especially Germany, for years. In this country, too, many propagandistic fairy tales have fallen on fertile ground. So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that there are still many people who understand Putin who attack me every day. On the other hand, I am pleased that their number has decreased in view of Russia’s unacceptable breaches of taboos. At least a lot of people just shut up now.
Will it remain so after a gas supply freeze, when people experience that prosperity and jobs in this country are in danger while Russia undauntedly continues its war of aggression?
Such far-reaching decisions need social acceptance in a democracy. People are rightly afraid that they might be left out in the cold this winter or lose their job next year. Politicians have a duty to socially cushion possible consequences. But: It is technically impossible for Russia to simply reduce domestic gas production to zero. That does not work. Then Putin would have to flare off the gas. It can certainly turn the gas tap on and off at times, but it can’t shut down gas production or divert the gas through other pipelines to other countries because they don’t exist.
Another realpolitik argument against permanently tearing down all bridges to Russia is that we are driving the country further into China’s arms and Europe is becoming increasingly isolated and weak in the world. Do you see this danger?
Your question suggests that Russia is a superpower. Militarily, Russia is above all the country with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. But in the war against Ukraine, this military superpower has fared rather poorly so far. And when it comes to future technologies, Russia is quite a dwarf, the Western sanctions will reinforce that even further. The Russian economic area is by far not as attractive as a sales market for the Chinese as Europe. Russia is a tired, sick colossus that rests one-sidedly on finite raw materials and military power. He’s pretty much faltered. It is kept alive by nationalism and colonialism, a violent dictator and anti-social turbo-capitalism. I urge you to have more self-confidence.
Your arguments are very topical, but in your guest article on the relationship with Russia you drew long lines from the icons of SPD Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, to the present day. Why does your SPD have to weigh up its historical ballast at every milestone? Or is that an indication of how difficult it is for your party to change course across the board?
Social Democrats strongly influenced Ostpolitik in the 1970s. It created the conditions for the reunification of Germany and Europe. This is a highly emotional topic. I was repeatedly accused of distancing myself from Willy Brandt’s principles with my Russia-critical attitude. Freeing oneself from understanding Russia and Putin does not mean turning away from the guiding principles of social-democratic foreign policy. But in view of the fundamental changes in the world, we must finally bring Ostpolitik into the new era. That’s why I reminded people that the ability to engage in dialogue always requires a willingness to defend oneself – that was already the case in Brandt’s time. In addition, something fundamental has changed: During the Cold War, the key to solving all problems lay in Moscow, regardless of whether it was about the GDR or today’s Eastern European countries. Today, no one needs to ask the Kremlin for permission to develop relations with the Baltic States, Ukraine or Moldova. That would be even nicer.
Nevertheless, you shake the self-image of a party that always thought it was on the right side of history.
The SPD has to admit that in the 1980s we failed to establish a reliable connection to the freedom movements in the GDR, in Poland or in Czechoslovakia. We were too fixated on stability and order at the time, and worried that the civil rights movements might disrupt that order when many didn’t credit them with overthrow or change. Today we know that civil society was very well able to do this. And that’s why we have to massively expand our anchor points in civil society, not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia, by offering Russians who do not want to submit to this dictatorship a refuge in free Europe.
You have been calling for a new relationship with the governments and societies in Eastern and Central Europe for some time. Against the will of the federal government and other western partner countries, Lithuania, for example, is currently driving the conflict over Kaliningrad. How far do we have to support everything that is said and decided by our eastern partners?
I expect quite simply that we deal seriously with the arguments of our partners in Central and Eastern Europe, that we take their perceptions and their concerns seriously. They more than deserve it, and these fears have a raison d’être, and not just since the war in Ukraine. Putin’s aggressive expansion policy began in Georgia in 2008 at the latest.
Is that why Lithuania alone can decide on the application of sanctions to intra-Russian transit to Kaliningrad?
As is well known, Lithuania has suffered for decades from its geographical position, which has led to some conflicts and threats to Lithuanian security. But we have not always taken this country’s prospects and fears as seriously as we should have. Our sanctions are not aimed at intra-Russian trade in goods, but Lithuania is concerned that Russia could circumvent the sanctions regime via the Kaliningrad exclave. I am optimistic that we will find a reasonable solution. We have to be very vigilant: Whenever a dispute breaks out in the EU, there is only one winner in the end – and his name is Putin.
However, it is difficult not to carry internal European conflicts to the outside world. Take Poland as an example: when your party leader Lars Klingbeil traveled to Warsaw, not a representative of the – to put it mildly – anti-Germany ruling party PiS took the time to meet him. How do you want to close the ranks like that?
I distinguish between the ruling PiS party and Polish society. I am all the more glad that Lars Klingbeil made this trip, which was certainly not subject to entertainment tax. It really bothers me that there is such a crunch between Germany and Poland at a time when teamwork is so important. But right now there is a chance to overcome this condition and come together again. It’s less about contacts with the governing party, which could end up in the opposition again next year. We must promote understanding among the Polish population. I know so many wonderful, courageous, deeply European-minded Poles. You are an example to me.
A small change of subject to Ukraine: The West does not have to publicly define its war goals. Ukraine’s partners create facts through the type and volume of arms deliveries. They signal to Kyiv whether the defensive battle will continue or whether an agreement must be reached with the aggressor. What signal is currently being sent by German arms deliveries?
There is still a realistic chance that not only will Russia not win this war, but that Ukraine will win. To me that means that it can survive as a free, democratic country while preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the past few weeks, it has become very clear that the delivery of modern western equipment, also from Germany, makes a big difference. And that is why these arms deliveries must be continued consistently and comprehensively. Certainly the war will also change. This means that in the coming months Ukraine will increasingly focus on regaining territories conquered by Russia. Chancellor Scholz made it clear in the Bundestag that we will supply Ukraine with the weapons that it particularly needs in the respective phase of the war.
With what? The reserves of the Bundeswehr are said to be exhausted.
You have to say openly and honestly: Germany really cannot provide this support on its own. Ukraine will continue to be dependent on military material from the USA. But Poland, Great Britain and the Baltic States also play a very decisive role, as do France and the Netherlands, who have already done a great deal and together with us must do even more in the future. We must not let up in the coming weeks and months.
However, the federal government does not want to release any material that the Bundeswehr itself needs for national and alliance defense. If Ukraine is fighting our war and Russia realistically doesn’t dare to attack NATO territory, doesn’t one have to accept short-term shortcomings in the Bundeswehr so ??that the Ukrainians don’t run out of ammunition in the middle of a battle?
Two arguments are decisive for me: First, we have to meet our NATO obligations. To my delight, the Federal Ministry of Defense also made far-reaching concessions in order to strengthen the so-called eastern flank. But secondly, our security does not currently have to be protected as much on our own national territory, but above all in Ukraine and on NATO’s eastern flank. I can understand that the Bundeswehr focuses on not being completely blank. Nevertheless: The course of the war will be decided in these days, weeks and months. We must therefore do even more now and in close consultation with our partners.
At the same time, part of the public is demanding that the war not be prolonged by further arms deliveries. Is it really said that if Russia were allowed to occupy the conquered territories as part of a ceasefire, the dying would end and Putin would otherwise be prevented from further military adventures?
Putin has succeeded in fooling people into believing that he has a serious interest in negotiations. The fact is: Russia wants to destroy Ukraine. There is absolutely no doubt about that. A ceasefire without troop withdrawals would only give Putin a welcome respite to bring more soldiers and military equipment to the front lines. Both are currently causing massive problems for Moscow, not least because of the Western sanctions, which are also hitting the Russian defense industry hard. If Ukraine were to lose this war, there would be a dramatic military conflagration in Moldova, Georgia and other states in the region, which would cost many more lives. But if Ukraine survives this war, then we too will gain more security, peace and stability in a highly dangerous region.
A farewell question: you have known the Ukrainian ambassador Andriy Melnyk for a long time, exchanged views with him before the recent war and rubbed his sometimes brash manner. What does his surprising departure say about German-Ukrainian relations?
I don’t quite understand some of the discussions. It is extremely unusual for an ambassador to hold a post for more than seven years. The fact that Mr. Melnyk is now given a new job is more or less normal in the life of a diplomat. He certainly polarized people, he hurt people and he certainly made mistakes. Defending Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera was a huge mistake. But I’ve always tried to put myself in his shoes: Melnyk represents a country that is fighting for its existence and its survival. He wanted to do something so that we do not turn a blind eye to this misery. He succeeded. For many, he was an uncomfortable, but in parts also necessary, player who opened our eyes. I wish him and his family all the best and a peaceful, free and democratic Ukraine. As we say so nicely here: goodbye.
Sebastian Huld spoke to Michael Roth
