Historian Jan C. Behrends: "Russia is an empire in dissolution"

Eastern Europe historian Jan Behrends doesn’t think much of the Wagenknecht-Schwarzer manifesto. In Germany, it is often not seen “that occupation for Ukraine is something completely different than occupation by the Americans or the British after 1945 for West Germans. For Ukraine, occupation does not mean the end of the war, but the beginning of terror against the civilian population .” Unlike countries like Poland, France, Ukraine or the USA, Germany does not have an emphatic concept of freedom. “The fact that one can take up arms against tyranny, against external aggression and for national self-determination is much more a matter of course in other countries. In Germany, on the other hand, it is completely legitimate in certain circles to doubt precisely this.”

Putin is concerned with returning to the Yalta order, says the historian. “This order stipulated that Soviet hegemony stretched as far as the Elbe,” said Behrends. “Putin writes and says quite openly that he wants to restore Russia’s sphere of influence not only in Ukraine but in all of Eastern Europe.”

ntv.de: The historian Timothy Snyder called the Russian war against Ukraine a colonial war. Is that true?

Jan C. Behrends: As a historian, I would say that this war is a colonial war because I see it as part of the process of dissolving the Russian Empire. This development began in 1917 and continues. Russia and Ukraine were the center and periphery, that’s definitely a colonial history. In terms of the nature of the war, however, it is not a classic colonial war of the kind waged by European powers in the 19th century, but a state war between two sovereign nations. Russia’s goal is renewed submission; Ukraine’s goal is to free itself from Russia’s imperial grip. Putin writes and says openly that he wants to restore Russia’s sphere of influence not only in Ukraine but in all of Eastern Europe. He is concerned with the return to the order of Yalta.

Is Russia a colonial power?

Of course. The Russian Empire was an empire since the 16th century, the time of Ivan the Terrible. It was not an overseas empire like France or Great Britain, but a land power, a multi-ethnic empire, and as such it has always maintained colonial relations with other peoples – from the Tatars to Poland or Finland to the peoples of Siberia, Central Asia or the Caucasus. Everywhere there, including in Ukraine, Russia has acted as an imperial power. But since 1917 it has been an empire in dissolution.

Since 1917? Isn’t that a very long time for a decay?

Empires are slowly dissolving, as we can see in the great historical empires from Rome to the British Empire. This does not happen with a bang, but lasts for decades or even centuries. In the case of the Russian Empire, we are dealing with a process that we have been witnessing since World War I: a slow detachment of the peripheries, first from Petersburg, then from Moscow, and the subsequent attempts to restore the Empire. One of these attempts was the Soviet Union, a Russian Empire under communist auspices, which then fell apart in 1991. Under Putin, the center is now making another attempt to restore old relations. But at the same time we see in Ukraine the strength of the nation-state idea and the willingness of the Ukrainians to fight for their sovereignty and against Moscow’s attempts at submission.

You called the Russian invasion of Ukraine the rebellion of the last Soviet generation. What do you mean by that?

Putin’s generation is the last to be fully socialized in the Soviet empire. For this generation, the order of Yalta is the natural order of Europe.

At the Yalta Conference in Crimea in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin decided to partition Europe.

This order established that Soviet hegemony extended as far as the Elbe. It ended in Europe in 1989 and in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR. In Putin’s view, the West used a brief moment of Russian weakness to destroy the Soviet position established after World War II. If you look at his demands from the draft treaties that Russia handed over to the United States in December 2021, then it becomes clear what he is about: Russia is calling for NATO to withdraw to the level of 1997, i.e. to the time before the first eastward enlargement . In effect, this was an ultimatum to the West. If you read the draft treaties carefully, you will find that they amount to restoring Yalta, an order that is geopolitically a strong identification point for the last Soviet generation. In a way, that’s good news, too.

In what way?

Subsequent generations of Russians who will eventually come to power do not share this obsession with victory in World War II and domination of Eastern Europe.

Which view of history does the Russian government propagate?

The official Russian history is always about the size and power of Russia. The empire can take on different forms: the tsarist empire, the Soviet Union under Stalin or even Russia under Putin. The continuity that is emphasized is Russia as a great power on the international stage. The Russian population is told that being a great power is more important than general prosperity or a functioning social system. This is an important difference between this imperial state and Ukraine. The aim of politics there is to improve conditions in their own country. Kyiv has no great power ambitions. What matters to the Russian elites and Putin is that their country is feared internationally. They are even willing to risk Russia’s prosperity and future for this.

What role does Stalin play in official propaganda?

Putin has inflated the cult of victory even further. This cult existed before, it was introduced under Leonid Brezhnev, …

… from 1964 to 1982 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

As was the case under Brezhnev, such a cult of victory can only be pursued if Stalin is rehabilitated to some extent, for he was the supreme commander in 1945. In addition, I believe that Vladimir Putin admires Stalin. He sees him as the one who created the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Using Stalin as an example, one can also show that Russian historical politics is not only a cult of remembrance, but also of forgetting: Putin’s propaganda celebrates Stalin of 1945, the triumphant of Berlin, the great general. There is silence about the time of the Great Terror, about the Gulag and the Hitler-Stalin pact – the Stalin of the 1930s disappears behind the winner of 1945.

Putin’s regime has often been described as a kleptocracy, a non-ideological mafia state. Was that wrong?

The non-ideological aspect was certainly wrong. Mafia state is an analogy that describes the informal relationships with the godfather and threats of violence as more important than institutional relationships. So far, so true. But this war shows that imperial ideology, at least for the core of the Russian elite, is more important than self-enrichment, which of course they also pursued extensively. They accept the sanctions, they accept that they can no longer go to Cannes or Miami. Their priority is the war against Ukraine. They are willing to pay a heavy price for imperial expansion.

What would happen if Russia were to win the war – either because the West stops supporting Ukraine or because that support is not big enough?

First of all, it would be a disaster for Ukraine. It would mean resubmission. It would mean that imperial projects in Europe would have a future again, that the order of the sovereign nation states of 1989/91 would falter. It would pose a concrete threat to the Baltic States and the states of Eastern Europe. But it would also be a defeat for the West. The self-confidence gained by the West’s very cohesive response to Russian aggression after the Afghan catastrophe would be called into question again. That could trigger a new crisis in the West.

What do you think of the “Manifesto for Peace” by Sahra Wagenknecht and Alice Schwarzer?

Nothing at all.

Are there such calls in Eastern European countries as well?

I don’t know anything about that.

Why is the public debate in Germany so different from, for example, in Poland?

I think this has to do with the different historical experiences. After two lost world wars, many in Germany can no longer imagine that wars can also be won – after 1871 it was still quite easy to imagine that in Germany, when people thought that Germany would win every war. In a way, it went from one extreme to the other. In addition to the negative experiences of war, there are the less negative experiences of occupation. This is often not seen in Germany: that occupation for Ukraine is something completely different than occupation by the Americans or the British after 1945 for West Germans. For Ukraine, occupation does not mean the end of the war, but the beginning of terror against the civilian population.

I’m also afraid that we don’t have such an emphatic concept of freedom as Poland, France, Ukraine or the USA. Germany was freed from National Socialism from outside. In other countries it is much more a matter of course that one can take up arms against tyranny, against external aggression and for national self-determination. In Germany, on the other hand, it is perfectly legitimate in certain circles to doubt exactly this.

Hubertus Volmer spoke to Jan C. Behrends