Armenia is part of the Russian-dominated military alliance, but receives no protection from it. It also has good relations with Iran, but is a democratic country. Armenia is at enmity with Azerbaijan. The EU wants to get more gas from there. Stephan Malerius from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Tbilisi explains the complex lines of conflict in the region.

ntv.de: In the summer, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed with Azerbaijan that the country would supply twice as much gas to Europe as before. Has the country increased its supply since then?

Stephan Malerius No, not significantly. Azerbaijan is technically unable to double the delivery volume.

Because they don’t have enough gas or because the capacity of the pipeline is insufficient?

The volume of the line would be large enough. But the flow rate cannot be increased. The British concern BP, which is involved in gas production in Azerbaijan, has announced that in the foreseeable future it will not be possible to extract the desired amount from the largest gas field in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan itself imports gas from Turkmenistan via Iran, and the Azerbaijani state-owned company Socar signed a gas supply contract with Gazprom in November. Why is Azerbaijan interesting as a gas supplier for Europe if it has to import gas itself?

There is a long-term perspective behind this. There are gas deposits in the Caspian Sea that can still be tapped. And then there’s Central Asian gas. The delivery of Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan is particularly interesting for Europe.

Gazprom is to deliver 1 billion cubic meters of gas to Azerbaijan by March. Can it be ruled out that Azerbaijan will continue to sell this Russian gas to Europe?

That cannot be ruled out. When the gas arrives in Europe, it cannot be determined whether it is Russian or Azerbaijani gas. The Azerbaijanis are likely to retreat to the position of buying and reselling Russian gas for their own needs, which is not needed to fulfill the promises made. But of course that’s milkmaid math. In fact, Russian gas is being bought to meet Europe’s increased demand. This is not how Europe becomes less dependent on Russian gas.

How does the EU explain this detour? Gas imports from Russia are not subject to sanctions. In theory, the EU could buy this gas directly from Russia.

They don’t want that, they want to become less dependent on Russian gas and, above all, no longer want to have supply contracts with Gazprom.

Isn’t that a bit dishonest?

Well, when the President of the Commission was in Baku in July, she could still assume that Azerbaijan would be able to increase its production capacities.

How reliable is Azerbaijan as a trading partner anyway? Azerbaijan is known for bribery and money laundering, especially towards Europe.

That’s right. And there is a second aspect to consider in this context: Azerbaijan can be a pragmatic partner for Europe, but not a strategic partner. It is an authoritarian country that is very aggressive towards its neighbor Armenia. Azerbaijan only invaded Armenia in September and has occupied Armenian territory to this day. And unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia is a democratic country. If we look at the situation from a values ??perspective, then Armenia should be a partner of the EU, not Azerbaijan. Armenia is also fundamentally interested in moving closer to Europe. The Azerbaijani leadership, on the other hand, wants to sell energy sources to Europe, but does not want to move closer to Europe in areas such as compliance with democratic standards.

What role does Russia play in this conflict?

Azerbaijan’s position towards Russia is very ambivalent. Russia has been supplying arms to Azerbaijan on a large scale for years. In the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war and now in September, Russia has also been very quiet, which is notable because Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated military alliance of which Azerbaijan is not a member. When Azerbaijan attacked Armenia, the Alliance would have been obliged to stand by Armenia. Armenia has also asked the CSTO for help, but Russia has done nothing. This behavior of Russia is very beneficial for Azerbaijan.

At the same time, since the 2020 war, Russian “peacekeeping forces” have been on Azerbaijani territory. They will be stationed there until at least 2025, trying to protect the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh – the region in Azerbaijan inhabited by Armenians. There is constant high tension between the Russian troops and the Azerbaijani army.

Two weeks ago, a deputy in the Baku parliament suggested renaming Azerbaijan “Northern Azerbaijan”. What’s it all about?

In the north of Iran there is a large Azerbaijani minority, two Iranian regions are even called West and East Azerbaijan. There has been massive tension between Iran and Azerbaijan for several months. It’s about different things, including the Azerbaijani minority. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev keeps asking them to think about where they want to belong – so secessionist tendencies are being stirred up there.

Iran and Armenia, on the other hand, have good relations. Between the two countries there is a border about 60 kilometers wide, which is very important for both Armenia and Iran. East of this border is Azerbaijan, west of which is the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. There is no land connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, so Azerbaijan would like to create an extraterritorial corridor there that would run through Armenian territory. Armenia and Iran firmly oppose it – Iran has threatened to take action if Azerbaijan tries to implement the plan.

A threat of war.

As recently as October, Iran held extensive military maneuvers on the border with Azerbaijan. There is a border river there, the Aras, which does not always run parallel to the border, but flows sometimes on Iranian and sometimes on Azerbaijani territory. There, Iran practiced translating across the river. Last week, Azerbaijan responded with maneuvers, along with Turkey. They, too, have trained to cross the macaw. Hardly a day goes by when the state media of both countries do not express themselves very aggressively against their neighbors and assert territorial claims.

How can the EU assert geostrategic interests in such a region?

The European Union is not a “hard power” and does not have much to offer in such conflicts. What Europe can do here is diplomacy, and it has been used wisely. At the summit in Prague in October, EU Council President Charles Michel brought together Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev for talks. The EU then sent an observer mission to the Armenian border for two months. They also acted as a kind of shield for Armenia against renewed aggression from Azerbaijan. The conflict hasn’t been resolved, but that can definitely be seen as a success.

Hubertus Volmer spoke to Stephan Malerius