From sunrise to sunset, the streets of Khartoum are almost deserted at the start of Ramadan, a month fasted by the vast majority of Muslims in the land of the two Niles. Political progress seems to be continuing, however, despite the Islamic calendar. The committee responsible for drafting the agreement supposed to turn the page on the October 25, 2021 coup thus met on the first day of the holy month of Islam, March 23. Four days earlier, the signatories of the preliminary roadmap initialed in December announced the promulgation of a final text for April 1 and the appointment of a government within the following ten days. A bundle of uncertainties nevertheless hangs over the respect of these deadlines.
“It will be difficult to sign the agreement without resolving this issue,” admits Salih Amar, a member of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition overseeing negotiations with the junta. The “problem” is the reform of the security sector which is the subject of a workshop from March 26 to 29. The flagship measure concerns the integration into the army of the powerful militia of the Rapid Support Forces under the orders of the wealthy number two of the Sovereignty Council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, nicknamed “Hemeti”. “I don’t know of any other country in the same situation, with two armies of equal strength. However, the gap between the two commanders, Hemeti and General Burhan who leads the army, is very deep,” continues Salih Amar, also a former governor of Kassala state.
“Delaying commitments securing security sector reform until a final agreement is reached would be a mistake, as this issue is the most important administrative issue in the democratic transition,” warns analyst Kholood Khair. It is better to delay the signature rather than have it take place before the formulation of these commitments. The lack of common understanding on the modalities of integration indeed increases the risks of political instability and a new coup d’etat, “says the director of the think tank Confluence Advisory.
The definition of the contours of traditional justice is also among the key points supposed to precede the pact. This mechanism should address the victims of the thirty years of military-Islamic dictatorship and then of the abuses committed since the ousting of former President Omar el-Bashir, in particular since the putsch. A workshop brought together some 400 participants from March 17 to 21, including families of “martyrs”. “The main recommendation concerns the refusal to grant immunity, regardless of the criminal. This includes Heads of State,” said FFC representative Salih Amar, who helped organize the meeting. Even if he recognizes the absence of guarantees to translate this principle into reality.
There are no more safeguards protecting the conclusions of the previous working groups devoted to the dismantling of the old regime, the revision of the peace agreement of October 3, 2020 and the crisis in the east of the country. . “These workshops did not provide any specific answer,” notes researcher Jihad Mashamoun, who doubts adherence to the schedule. Adding that “the military finds itself in a win-win situation. The formation of a government could even restore their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. In the end, they are the ones who will keep the weapons and the power. On the other hand, the fact that the citizens continue to protest already alters the credibility of this government, if it were to be put in place. »
These demonstrations are mainly organized by neighborhood resistance committees. The latter reject the prior agreement reached with the military in December when an initiative launched by these revolutionaries themselves was about to unite all the pro-democracy forces. “We are going to need time to restore confidence with the politicians”, explains Mukhtar Atif, of the coordination of these local antennas within the state of Khartoum, in the perspective of the future Parliament. The former Prime Minister, Abdallah Hamdok, never managed to take this step during the two years of transition that followed the fall of Omar el-Béchir.
While waiting for these likely talks, the resistance committees prefer to focus on small-scale governance. “We want to put the spirit of the revolution back in the hands of young people,” summarizes Mukhtar Atif. This development manager for a fintech cites projects aimed at tracking down corruption among local leaders, encouraging local residents to participate in power by managing the local economy or even encouraging companies to provide their areas of operation with infrastructure. public. “The local authority must gradually take full ownership of its security, economy and development,” insists the activist.
Politicians remain riveted on their negotiations, anxious to establish their authority over the transitional period that will result. Salih Amar, of the FFC, reports “tense debates”, in particular on the form that the next government will take, which could be composed of politicians or technocrats selected by these same parties. The choice of the Prime Minister is also essential at the heart of the negotiations. Many consider that the wisest course would be to recall Abdallah Hamdok. Currently based in Abu Dhabi, the Sudanese-British doctor in economics has not yet accepted.
Once again, the international community, led by the United Arab Emirates, could have the last word. “The combination of Hamdok and RSF boss Hemeti represents a viable formula for the Emirates to safeguard their own interests in Sudan,” Kholood Khair said. The analyst, however, rejects the idea that the second can be a guarantor of balance. Its forces are involved in the war in Darfur that began in the early 2000s, in the bloody dismantling on June 3, 2019 of the revolutionary sit-in in front of the army headquarters and in the abuses committed on the sidelines of the peaceful processions that made at least 125 dead since the putsch. From early March, Hemeti brought in hundreds of troops and vehicles from the southwest of the country amid heightened tensions with army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Observers remain divided on a real risk of armed confrontation.
