Not all miserable actions fall under the Penal Code. The Supreme Court has just confirmed the acquittal of a man whose partner died of a heart attack shortly after he left her alone unwell in her car, despite the fact that he “realized” the seriousness of the situation.
The man had been accused of a crime of omission of the duty to help. The Alicante Court convicted him, but the Superior Court of Justice acquitted him, in a decision that is now endorsed by the High Court. The conduct of the accused is “especially reprehensible from an ethical level,” says the Supreme Court, but adding that “failure to comply with a generic duty of solidarity is not enough to consider the crime of omission of the duty to help committed.”
The proven facts are these: the accused and the woman, who were in a romantic relationship, had agreed to meet and drove their respective vehicles to the vicinity of the Alicante Mortuary. He parked her vehicle and drove hers to a nearby bar, where they had a drink. Then they went to a motel.
As soon as she entered the room, at 6:45 p.m., the woman felt unwell, dizzy and nauseated. They decided to leave there at 7:05 p.m. The accused drove the car to where the woman was, reclined her seat and opened the window. At around 7:40 p.m., when they arrived near the funeral home, the accused got out of the car and remained for a few minutes next to the woman, who continued to feel unwell and was sitting with her body forward and her head on her legs. “Aware of her seriousness and persistence,” the man decided to leave the place, leaving her alone. The woman died around 9:30 p.m. from an acute myocardial infarction. A security guard found her shortly after her.
A jury sentenced the man as the author of a crime of omission of the duty to help to six months of fine with a daily fee of 4 euros (720 euros) and to pay compensation of 30,000 euros to the woman’s relatives for moral damages. . The TSJ upheld the convicted person’s appeal and acquitted him in a ruling that the family of the deceased took to the Supreme Court to request, with the support of the Prosecutor’s Office, that a sentence be issued.
In its resolution, the Supreme Court considers that the facts that are declared proven do not allow the requirements for the commission of the crime to be identified “with the necessary clarity.” “Not even the symptoms of indisposition – dizziness and nausea – that [the woman] presented at the time [the accused] left did allow a situation of serious and obvious danger to her life to be represented,” says the TS, recalling that it was considered proven in the trial that the man was not aware of any previous heart condition of the woman.
“Nor is a criminally relevant situation of helplessness described. In particular, the circumstances that explain why the [woman] herself did not request medical assistance by telephone during the period since the symptoms of illness began – around 7:00 p.m. – until the moment in which the accused left the place – around 7:40 p.m. – when, at the same time, it is declared proven that during that time lapse she did not lose consciousness at any time.”
The sentence includes a dissenting opinion from Judge Julián Sánchez Melgar in which he expresses his disagreement with the majority’s opinion and defends that the appeal of the private prosecution should be upheld and, consequently, sentencing the accused to a fine as the author of a crime. crime of omission of the duty of relief.
In his vote he affirms that in the case examined all the requirements that make up this crime are met, which are the following: “first, that the person providing assistance is in a situation of manifest and serious danger; without a doubt the situation was so serious In the case being prosecuted, J.I. died within a little more than an hour of the accused abandoning her; second, that said person was helpless; the woman was in serious condition in an inhospitable place; third, that the obligated person knew that this situation occurred. situation; the account of events undoubtedly says that this was the case; fourth, that he has the capacity, without risk to himself or others, to provide help personally or to demand help from third parties, and in this case, in my opinion, there was no element that could be prevented it.”