The standoff that has pitted the Nigerien putschists against France for a month has reached its climax with the 48-hour ultimatum addressed to Ambassador Sylvain Itté, asked to leave Niamey before Sunday evening. Paris refuses to recall its ambassador, claiming that the putschists did not have the legitimacy to demand it. France does not recognize the regime resulting from the coup and calls for the release of President Bazoum and his return to power. Meanwhile, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is continuing its diplomatic initiatives while waiting to decide on the contours of a military intervention to restore constitutional order. Journalist Frédéric Lejeal, author of the book Le Déclin franco-africain. The Impossible Break with the Colonial Pact (L’Harmattan, 2022), reissued earlier in March 2023, deciphers the ins and outs of a war of nerves which is reminiscent of how much the stakes go well beyond the Niger. Indeed, the overthrow of President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26 opened a period of instability for the entire West African sub-region, including in terms of security.
Le Point Afrique: The showdown between France and Niger has reached its climax in recent days as the junta that took power in Niamey demands the departure of the French ambassador. Is this request legal and how does it fit?
Frédéric Lejeal: These tensions follow the coup against Mohamed Bazoum on July 26. They went crescendo as Paris expressed its desire not to recognize this junta led by General Abdourahamane Tiani, head of the presidential guard since 2011, and not to follow up on any of its requests or decisions. It is important to recall here that President Bazoum has still not officially resigned. Niamey wishes, among other things, to replace the current ambassador of Niger in France, Aïchatou Kané Boulama, a figure in the galaxy of the overthrown president whose son, DG of the Nigerien Post, a state company, was arrested in early August. The diplomat is therefore still in place with the consent of Paris. What displeases.
The dismissal of the French ambassador to Niger, Sylvain Itté, also contributes to the radicalization of the junta, supported by a fringe of Nigerien public opinion, towards the French presence in the country, in particular the military. On the merits, it is quite possible for a State to dismiss an ambassador. We saw this recently in Mali with the expulsion of Joël Meyer, in January 2022. This is a decision obviously fraught with meaning and consequences in the relationship between two countries.
France, through President Macron, reiterated forcefully that it was keeping Ambassador Sylvain Itté in his post and that it did not recognize the new authorities in Niamey. How long can this showdown last? What can be the consequences for Paris and the junta, if Mr. Itté were expelled from the country? What could be the future of diplomatic ties between the two states and especially the future of the French presence on Nigerien soil?
During a conference in Paris on August 28, President Emmanuel Macron effectively reiterated his full support for the diplomat while stressing that he would remain in office. Supposing that Niamey decides to expel Sylvain Itté, it would be necessary to enter the compound of the French Embassy in violation of all international treaties, in particular the Vienna Convention. This kind of action is very rare, especially since the diplomat is under the protection of special forces. The best known concerns the United States Embassy in Iran in 1979. If, however, such an action were to take place, whether by the junta or the mob, there is no doubt that it would cause a rupture of the diplomatic relations and strong reactions, including at European level. Radical voices are rising to impose a blackout on this chancellery by depriving it of water and electricity supplies. In the meantime, France is sticking to its positions. Only a reversal of authorities such as ECOWAS on this file or the resignation of President Bazoum could move the lines.
The next step is the departure of French soldiers from Niger?
For the time being, it has not been requested, although several civil society actors or coalitions such as M62, the movement born of President Bazoum’s decision to host the post-Barkhane system in 2022, are pushing for this scenario. The junta also denounced military cooperation agreements with France, which currently has 1,500 troops. It can be assumed that a request for the withdrawal of French forces will be the next step. The junta’s modus operandi is modeled on the situations in Mali and Burkina Faso, and seems to follow a scenario already tested in these two other Sahelian countries now also led by putschists. The Nigerien soldiers want to strike hard for two reasons: on the one hand, to go in the direction of a part of the opinion to establish their legitimacy and, on the other hand, to gain popularity and embody a kind of break with what they see as the stigmata of French neocolonialism. Symbolically, the French military presence contributes to this rejection well beyond the fight against terrorism.
Can France maintain its bases in Chad, but also in other African countries, in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, or Senegal or should we only analyze the situation only in the context of the Sahel?
France, more than any other country, is exposed precisely because of its heavy military footprint. The situation is even unprecedented. It is the only former European colonial power to “cross” the African continent through several prepositioned bases ranging from Senegal to Djibouti via Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad; numerous military cooperation agreements or External Operations (“Opex”) on the model of Barkhane.
Since independence, there have been nearly seventy military operations or interventions by Paris on this continent. In 2011, not so long ago, French soldiers intervened in Abidjan with heavy weapons. Whether it is legitimate or not, this militarism appears to many young Africans to be totally anachronistic and assimilated to a force of interference, even occupation. With the CFA franc, the symbolic charge remains extremely strong. Combined with the relative failure of the fight against jihadist groups, it produces enormous frustration and resentment. Riots against the French military presence occurred in Senegal but also in Chad. Last June, Emmanuel Macron reconfigured this device to make it more discreet and flexible. But this is still very insufficient. In Paris, it is difficult to understand that public opinion is attached to the symbol to which this presence refers. It would be in the interest of France, which has long played the “gendarmes” within its zone of influence, to withdraw from this plan in favor of a more effective economic soft power.
How to understand what is currently happening in Niger and why and how has France become the main target of demonstrators and the military when Niger has multiple partners such as China, the United States, Germany and many others ?
In this multifactorial crisis that is playing out in the Sahel, the poorest area in the world, France is at the center of criticism for the reasons mentioned above but also because, more generally, it is paying a boomerang for sixty years of interventionism in Africa, of political interference, often to install or even preserve autocratic regimes in line with its interests, a currency directly resulting from the colonial period or even a stigmatizing discourse on how Africans should live, how many children they should have, what regime policy they must adopt, etc. Most of the other countries you mention have neither this story nor a colonial past or have largely moved away from it, like Portugal, Germany or the United Kingdom. Other partners like China do not have the same approach at all and also value the absence of a colonial past. During the time of the former USSR, Russia financed and supported many liberation movements, starting with Nelson Mandela’s ANC. All this speaks to the younger generations.
Paris also supports the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in any action, including military action, to restore constitutional order in Niger, at what price?
After the fall of Mali, Burkina Faso, but also Guinea, under the military yoke, France supports ECOWAS to try to stop this theory of dominoes, knowing that the disputes are also heard on the side of the Chadian populations, who reproach Paris for supporting the regime of Mahamat Idriss Déby. And all the more so as the sub-regional organization is playing its own survival on this issue. France plays big. Assuming that it provides assistance, be it only financial or logistical, to a military operation aimed at restoring President Bazoum, this would not fail to stir up its rejection in the Sahel.
We have seen images of Nigeriens showing their support for the putschists and at the same time expressing a certain hostility towards France, without having official figures, what is the share of reality today on this anti-French feeling of which it is so many questions…
It is difficult to assess. There is a desire for France on the part of many Africans but above all an obvious and global questioning of its African policy. This can be understood in the light of its past, which has not always been glorious. Far from it. But this distrust also emanates from a large number of activists, figures of civil society, some of whom are in commissioned service. A fringe of African public opinion has made France the scapegoat for all evil. These people want to move on. Turn the page on this relationship deemed suffocating and open the horizon to other partners. What we note nevertheless is that the fabric of the hexagonal companies is hardly worried and adapts its devices. Although Air France services have been stopped, there is currently no impact on the activities of Orano (ex-Areva) in Niger, while this company is at the center of criticism.
What future for West African countries, can this coup in Niamey mark a turning point for the region?
They are clearly divided within ECOWAS between supporters of strong action (Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc.) and a bloc of hostile countries united around a pan-African reading. It is hard to see how this organization could recover from non-intervention and, at the same time, it is difficult to see how it could intervene. Putting Mohamed Bazoum back in the saddle requires an operation on the ground with the deployment of special forces and hundreds of men, and an assault on the presidency with all the risks that entails. Time therefore plays in favor of the junta. What is remarkable is that the anti-French logorrhea completely removes security issues from radar screens. A favorable situation for jihadist groups. In mid-August, around twenty soldiers were killed during the worst attack on Nigerien territory.
