“We want Russia”, “Down with France”. Anti-French and pro-Russian slogans were shouted again on Sunday during a pro-coup demonstration in Niamey, Niger, four days after presidential guard commander Abdourahamane Tchiani took power.
Justified by the country’s “security situation”, this coup d’etat risks increasing instability in the region and further weakening French influence there, after the putschs in Burkina Faso in September 2022. , and in Mali in August 2020. If the situation in the country has been condemned by Russia as well as by ECOWAS and Westerners, the repetition questions. Should this be seen as the mark of Moscow?
For Thierry Vircoulon, Associate Researcher at Ifri’s Africa Center and author of La RussAfrique à la test de la guerre, if “the scenario playing out in Niamey is the same as in Ouagadougou and Bamako”, Russia loses in credibility in Africa since the start of the war in Ukraine.
Le Point: Is a pro-Russian bloc forming in Africa with Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and now Niger?
Thierry Vircoulon: For Niger, we must not go too fast. Events are in progress, we have to see what happens. The pro-Russia bloc is noticeable through the votes at the UN. Last February, in fact, Eritrea and Mali voted in favor of Russia in the resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine, while the Central African Republic abstained. But a bloc of two isn’t much over fifty-four states. Those who abstain are not taking a position: they are opportunistic or cautious, it depends on the prism, and seek to up the ante in the ongoing geostrategic clash between Russia and the West.
But since stalling in Ukraine, where it is far from a winner, Russia has been retreating in Africa, where its image as a military power is shaken. One of its main levers of influence is the sale of arms. We don’t have figures for 2022, but logically the Russian arms industry is running on the battlefield in Ukraine, so it should be less capable of supplying it.
The economic contracts concluded at the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019 turned out to be for many of the ceremonial contracts, few were implemented. And while Russian oil sales have increased since the start of the war in Ukraine, the rest of exports are down due to sanctions. It is not even certain that Vladimir Putin will manage to deliver the cereals which he promised to supply – and which he is also seeking to sell – during the recent Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg. For this, its boats would have to leave the Black Sea and arrive as far as Africa, which will once again be difficult to achieve.
There is a great disproportion between Moscow’s rhetoric and its concrete achievements in Africa. Africans are aware of this: Russian rhetoric is not followed up and this leads to a loss of credibility. In Saint Petersburg, only 17 African heads of state were present, compared to 45 in Sochi in 2019. Some did not even want to appear in the photo.
What are the Kremlin’s influence strategies on the continent?
Apart from arms sales, Russia mainly uses diplomatic-media communication to seduce African countries. Moscow emphasizes that in the multipolar world it says it promotes, Africa would have a say and matter. Russia also plays on anti-colonial resentment, claiming that it was never a colonial power, which of course is false, but it was not in Africa. It recalls the past and accuses Europeans via social networks, in particular Facebook.
Its strategy is also based on offers of cooperation, in the military field, but also in education, with offers of training and scholarships for African students, which have continued despite the war in Ukraine. This of course remains anecdotal in relation to the number of students in Africa.
However, Russian flags were waved in Niamey during a pro-coup and anti-French demonstration on Sunday. How to explain it?
It has become a kind of tradition. As soon as there is a putsch, there is a demonstration in front of the French Embassy with Russian flags. This can be attributed to the digital propaganda campaigns launched by Russia.
Africa has been the field of direct rivalry between France and Russia since Putin decided in 2017, AFTER the first war in Ukraine [in 2014, during the capture of Crimea, Ed]. From there, Western sanctions were taken against Russia, which in turn decided to go on the offensive. Russia wants both to develop in Africa in the face of sanctions, and to reduce French influence there, in order to weaken France and give it back its own coin.
This is obvious, when analyzing disinformation maneuvers on the networks: the organizations targeted are the UN, the European Union and France, but never the United States for example. The problem is that the awareness of France was late, from the installation of Wagner in the Central African Republic and then in Mali. It is still too early to say that it will happen this way in Niger.
It can be said that a campaign has been going on for several years to stir up anti-French feelings and expel France from these countries. There are, however, no special Russian interests in Niger, although the scenario playing out there is the same as in Ouagadougou and Bamako. Russia sells weapons in Niamey, but there are no specific activities there. It is still notable that this putsch took place barely a day after the opening of the Russia-Africa summit.
