Faster, more accurate, better connected – the Puma should be able to do almost everything and turns out – and not just now – to be a total failure. For the future, Lambrecht has to shift the focus on gun purchases – less fancy, but fit.
18 out of 18 – it’s seldom that thick. It is fatal for one’s own reputation if the situation can be summarized in such a handy proportion. What the “7 to 1” said about the condition of the Brazilian Seleção at the 2014 World Cup will remain the “18 of 18” for the Bundeswehr for quite a while. The statement “The Bundeswehr is standing there blank” made by Army Inspector Alfons Mais on February 24 of this year, condensed into two numbers.
The oath of disclosure is not unexpected. Anyone who has exchanged views with commanders of the Bundeswehr over the past few months could already guess that the troops would probably not be drawn into NATO’s “spearhead”, the “Very High Readyness Joint Task Force” (VJTF), with the most technically sophisticated tank in the world . In any case, this was openly doubted at commander level in the army, since the Puma had already shown itself in the past to be far too vulnerable to withstand such a load.
There are several reasons why there was a total failure within a few days. On the one hand, with a technically highly developed system, there is almost always the problem that it is at the expense of robustness. But when the SPD man Peter Struck ordered the Puma as Defense Minister in 2002, other things came to the fore: Still under the impression of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the new tank should definitely be transportable in the air so that it could theoretically also be used in more distant battles , for example in the Middle East.
However, 13 years after the fall of the wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, possible war missions in Europe are already being pushed into the background by those responsible. What decides on the battlefield, namely a technology that has endurance and on which the troops can blindly rely, plays a subordinate role in the decision for the Puma. More decisive is and remains also with Struck’s successors, whether they are called Jung, zu Guttenberg, von der Leyen or Kramp-Karrenbauer, the superlative with which one can score – also externally.
It has to be the most technically advanced infantry fighting vehicle in the world, and then it needs a handful of extra electronic finesse just for the Germans. It is this fundamental requirement that German security policy in 2022 so visibly stumbles over. “We always want gold-rimmed solutions, the best of the best,” says military expert Wolfgang Richter in an interview with ntv.de, but he believes the Bundeswehr is paying a high price for this, on several levels.
Problem one: “That final touch of quality, above good quality and leading to top quality, often costs three times what a slightly simpler system would cost.” So Germany pays high sums for its weapons – even in the case of the Puma, the price has continued to rise over the years due to many conversions, up to about twice the originally estimated budget. In return you get sophisticated technology, but in small quantities.
The small amount is a consequence of problem two: It takes many years of development before such a filigree system really works, and further years in procurement, which then turn into a few years of testing – accompanied by price increases, technical problems, resulting in delays in delivery, renewed price increases, to be continued. “When you buy a high-quality system like the Puma, it also means that this system hasn’t been tested before,” says Richter. “It will have a number of teething problems before the system can be said to be fully operational.”
There is no question that the requirements for an infantry fighting vehicle are not trivial: off-road, on track, on inclines and declines, and the vehicle also has to be able to cope with water to a certain extent. With speed and turning manoeuvres, the cannon should be as stable as possible. To do this, the tank must protect the crew against mines, direct fire and artillery splinters. After all, the tank should be networked, in conjunction with other units, which requires a situation picture that is available electronically.
If everything works, a device with enormous capabilities. But at what point the technology is actually ready for use only becomes clear when the tank is in use by the troops. Exactly at the same time 18 out of 18 Pumas fell out. Which leads directly to problem three: the lack of maintenance.
High-quality armament technology offers many skills while at the same time being as simple as possible to use. However, this means that the operator can hardly react if the system fails. You need on-site repairs. However, the Bundeswehr has given up a large part of its logistics for army maintenance to industry. The systems are serviced and repaired there.
This type of logistics works, but only as long as the technology does not actually have to be used. However, over the years, the various department heads in the Ministry of Defense have lost sight of the possibility of a serious combat mission.
“But we live in a different world situation now,” says security expert Richter. “We now need systems that, with a view to the highest standards, may not achieve 100 percent, but only 95 percent, but which are available with mass and reliably.” That is what decides in battle. The Bundeswehr needs its own repair teams for this, which, when the troops are in the field, repairs broken technology behind the battle lines, and that in the shortest possible time.
Fewer superlatives, less dependency on industry, but a return to competence and logistics in maintenance. And above all, the focus must be on operational readiness in combat: major challenges for the Bundeswehr that require energy and the will to reform. In order to push all this, a total failure as pithy as last week’s “18 of 18” is perhaps not the worst starting point.
