The cause of the leaks in the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines is still unclear. Many experts blame Russia for this. Sebastian Bruns, an expert in maritime security at the University of Kiel, is more cautious, but counts Russia among the suspects. With ntv.de he talks about possible motives, the damage to the pipeline and the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure under water – and what options there are for protecting it.
ntv.de: Experts consider it likely that Russia is responsible for the leaks in the Nord Stream pipelines. Would you agree?
Sebastian Bruns: The evidence suggests that. But until we have evidence, I would be wary of pointing the finger at any particular state actor. But if you look at the motive, motivation and means needed to bring about this explosion, then Russia belongs to the group of suspects.
But you assume an act of sabotage?
At this point, and without knowing exactly how big the holes in the pipelines are, I’m assuming it was sabotage. It cannot be ruled out that it was an accident, a chain of unfortunate circumstances or a natural disaster. But at the moment everything looks like it was deliberately brought about.
What motives might Russia have?
This can be domestic political considerations, taking the incident as additional support for partial mobilization. But it could also have a foreign and security policy reason: it could be a signal that Russia is capable of disrupting or destroying energy infrastructure almost anywhere in the world. That would fit into Russia’s strategy of weaponizing energy and energy policy.
Are scenarios other than Russian sabotage conceivable?
At this point in time, I would not rule out that another state actor is behind it. But we lack the imagination, for example, that it could have been the USA. They have the means, but what motivation should they have? The same applies to speculation that other actors in the Baltic Sea region could be responsible or that Ukraine is even involved. One quickly gets into the realm of speculation or fantasy in Tom Clancy’s spy novels.
How can the incident be investigated, after all, the crime scene is 70 to 80 meters under the sea?
According to the Danish Navy, it will take about a week and a half for the gas to completely escape from the pipelines. After that, you can dive to the leaks with underwater drones or mini-submarines to assess the extent of the damage. Combat divers could probably also work at this depth, but the effort would be too great for that. If the damage is known, it can be checked whether sealing or reconstruction is worthwhile.
How do you assess the damage, have the pipelines become unusable?
The Swedish Navy has just reported another leak, so the lines could also be damaged in other places by the explosions or vibrations. The leaks themselves can probably be sealed relatively easily. In addition, there is corrosion damage – the penetrating salt water can make the pipelines unusable. Although the brackish water of the Baltic Sea does not have such a high salt content, it is apparently sufficient to damage the pipes. And if they are rusted and there is also a lack of political will and thus the money to stop the corrosion or to re-lay the pipelines, then you have to reckon with the fact that they will no longer be in operation.
Are there other examples of sabotage actions of this kind?
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time to this extent. In the past there have been repeated attempts by terrorists to destroy pipelines. But I don’t know of any case where this happened underwater and at this depth. However, there have been accidents in which, for example, a ship’s anchor has damaged a pipeline or an underwater cable.
Which countries have equipment that could be used to attack underwater power lines?
Most western naval forces have at least small submarines. Traditional submarine nations like Sweden or Germany not only have conventional submarines, but also much smaller versions and underwater drones. The Danish Navy may have gotten rid of their submarine fleet, but I’m sure they also have such small devices.
And Russia?
In recent years it has become clear that while Russia’s surface forces are outdated, Russia is very well equipped underwater. This goes from nuclear-capable submarines to micro and mini submarines with a wide range of capabilities. The West has not invested as much in such technology, including the ability to detect these Russian submarines. We’re learning this the hard way now.
You mentioned Tom Clancy, whose novel The Hunt for Red October is about a nearly silent submarine. Does that exist in reality?
If there is, at least I’m not aware of it. But technology has advanced since the 1980s, when the novel is set. For example, there are so-called gliders that can operate relatively unnoticed under water. However, if they are manned at all, they have two or three people on board, so they are not comparable to a huge nuclear submarine like in the novel. Overall, a lot has happened technologically in the entire underwater area. However, many of these developments take place in secret and are difficult to follow, even for scientists like me.
How dependent is Germany on connections above and below water?
90 percent of international trade goes by sea – and Germany, as the so-called world export champion, is no exception. This is about maritime trade, but also about energy and raw material imports: liquid gas, coal, oil, rare earths. We are probably more maritime dependent and vulnerable than many of our partner nations. This not only applies to the coast, but also to Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, because the car and machine builders there depend on safe sea routes and a secure energy supply. In addition, 95 percent of international communication runs via underwater cables. Imagine what a disruption would mean not only for private Internet traffic, but also for banks and stock exchanges.
How does Germany deal with this vulnerability?
The sea routes are also a bit of a legal vacuum and the Federal Republic has only limited means to comprehensively monitor them. Therefore, the focus is more on securing bottlenecks – whether natural, such as straits and bays, or man-made, such as terminals, canals or pipelines. However, the topic of resilience, i.e. dealing with possible disruptions, has become more of a focus in recent years. On the one hand, it is about protecting the infrastructure, but on the other hand, it is also about finding ways to cushion any disruptions.
What technical options are there for monitoring pipelines and underwater cables?
This is really difficult. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline, for example, is 1230 kilometers long, i.e. longer than the A7 between the Danish and Austrian borders. Imagine five or six police cars driving down this stretch hoping that no accidents would happen. On the one hand, it makes sense to concentrate on the bottlenecks mentioned, on the landing points of pipelines and submarine cables. On the other hand, it has to be accepted that certain things are beyond our control. This applies not only to natural disasters and accidents, but also to actors who are willing and able to attack, disrupt and destroy such infrastructure.
The Federal Police want to control the critical underwater infrastructure more closely, and the German Navy should also play a role. Are both institutions equipped accordingly?
A lot is missing. The Federal Police Sea has just received four new, relatively large patrol ships with a gun on the bow. However, due to a lack of personnel, she cannot keep up with training the crew. When Interior Minister Nancy Faeser says that the federal police want to patrol the North Sea and Baltic Sea 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, with four ships and maybe a couple of helicopters – that’s wishful thinking.
What about the Navy?
We currently have the smallest German Navy of all time. There, too, there is a severe shortage of staff and there is a lack of strategic orientation. The Bundeswehr is traditionally army-oriented, and the security policy establishment has been dealing with Afghanistan and Mali for 20 years, where the navy has only ever played a minor role. Since 1990, she has mainly carried out operations of medium and low intensity – against pirates, smugglers and sanctions breakers. The Navy first has to learn the other skills, such as anti-submarine warfare or combating sea targets. Unfortunately, there is a strong form of sea blindness in Germany. The Navy is good enough to throw a cocktail reception at Kiel Week, but when it comes to resources, they tend to lose out.
Can the federal police and navy work together?
Both institutions cooperate, but not to the extent that would be desirable, because internal and external security are separate in Germany. Both have skills, but they are too small for what politics actually needs from them.
In the course of the NATO accession of Finland and Sweden, the Baltic Sea was often referred to as a NATO sea, because then all the neighboring countries except Russia would belong to the alliance. Can that increase security?
I’m careful with the term NATO sea because it implies wishful thinking that the Baltic Sea no longer needs to be taken care of. But Russia is still a neighbor and still has the opportunity for disruptive maneuvers. It’s not about large naval formations or a major sea battle in the Baltic Sea. But Russia could come up with the idea of ??testing NATO’s anti-submarine defenses or using hybrid measures to demonstrate its claims as a neighboring country.
Markus Lippold spoke to Sebastian Bruns
