Since the end of August, fighting has resumed between the government army and separatist groups from the North, in a more complex context, after the departure of French and UN forces. The Malian army now finds itself, with its Russian partners, facing one more adversary over a vast territory, much of which escapes its control. Can these events call into question the Algiers peace agreements signed in 2015? Keys to understanding.
Armed groups, predominantly Tuareg in favor of independence or autonomy for northern Mali, attacked army positions in Bourem. This is the first large-scale operation claimed by these groups, signatories of a peace agreement in 2015, after months of tensions. The army took back its positions. The two camps deliver diametrically opposed versions that are difficult to verify as to the results and the winner. The army says that 10 of its soldiers have died and that it has “neutralized “46” terrorists.” The armed groups say they have killed 97 soldiers, captured 5 and lost 9 men.
This operation strongly resembles an open resumption of hostilities and the end of the 2015 agreement.
The main protagonist on the side of the rebellion is the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), an alliance of armed groups predominantly Tuareg, a traditionally nomadic population which has risen several times since 1962. These groups have taken up arms again in 2012 for independence or autonomy. After a ceasefire in 2014, the CMA signed the now moribund so-called Algiers peace agreement in 2015 with the government and loyalist groups fighting alongside it.
The 2012 insurgency paved the way for armed groups linked to Al-Qaeda to conquer most of the north, triggering a military intervention by France and plunging the Sahel into war with casualties numbering in the thousands.
The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, operates over a large part of the territory, in the north, in the center, and even on the outskirts of the capital. In the northeast, groups affiliated with the Islamic State organization have extended their control over almost all administrative circles in the Ménaka region.
“Much of the north of the country has fallen under the de facto domination of militant Islamist groups,” says the American think tank Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
After the double putsch of 2020 and 2021, the Malian junta pushed out the French anti-jihadist force in 2022 and the UN force (Minusma) in 2023. It is widely considered to have enlisted the services of the paramilitary company Russian Wagner, despite his denials.
The withdrawal of peacekeepers must be completed by December 31. Minusma was commonly criticized for its contribution deemed insufficient to the fight against jihadism. However, it was the only one capable of interposing between the Tuareg separatists and the Malian army.
His gradual departure is believed to have contributed to the escalation in the north. Minusma hands over its camps to the Malian authorities. But in the ongoing territorial struggle, the separatists believe that the UN territories should return to their control. The subject will become even hotter by the end of 2023 with the Kidal camp, a Tuareg stronghold town.
GSIM and groups affiliated with the Islamic State are fighting the army. They refrain from attacking urban areas, but compete for resources (water points, gold mines, taxation of populations) at the cost of bloody battles and massive displacements of populations. The predominantly Tuareg groups are fighting against the jihadists and, again it seems, the army. In this tangle, alliances are woven. The question of a convenient alliance between separatists and GSIM is raised.
“There may be circumstantial, temporary allies who will clash tomorrow. Our real enemy is the Fama”, Malian armed forces, assures a member of an armed group under cover of anonymity, while refuting any collaboration with the jihadists.
The junta in power in Bamako has made the reconquest of territory its mantra and favors the military option. Despite air control, the opening of an additional front risks putting to the test an already stretched army at the same time as the junta’s assurances of recovery of the security situation.
“Mali is on track to experience more than 1,000 violent events involving militant Islamist groups in 2023, which would eclipse last year’s record levels of violence and represent a nearly threefold increase from when the junta took power in 2020,” says the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
