The head of the Kremlin appears weakened after the attempted rebellion of the private paramilitary company Wagner, Saturday, June 24. Benoît Vitkine, journalist for Le Monde in Russia, answered your questions.
Many versions circulate, sometimes exotic. It is also a sign of the feverishness that took hold of Russia this weekend. Westerners are not the only ones to get lost in guesswork. I don’t know if we will ever have a definitive answer, but in the meantime, the simplest explanation seems to me the most obvious: Yevgueni Prigojine knew his head was threatened, he wanted to save it. And for that he did what he always did: take everyone by surprise, outbid. (…)
On Sunday, the Meduza site said, citing sources in the Kremlin, that Prigozhin immediately made it clear that he was looking for a way to back down, after Putin’s very serious intervention. This would tend to confirm that the target was not the president, since at the same time Russia was amazed to discover that these famous columns going up towards Moscow were proving capable of progressing and posing a real threat to the capital.
You never know where Vladimir Putin is and that’s on purpose. His various cabinets (including those in shelters) are similarly designed so that even when he speaks, it’s unclear where he’s speaking from.
We obviously do not know everything about the resolution of the crisis. We don’t even know, this morning, where Evgueni Prigojine is. The Kommersant newspaper also notes that the criminal investigation opened against him is not, or not yet, formally closed, contrary to what the Kremlin announced.
Prigozhin also keeps levers. His men are not disarmed, and not even scattered. According to him, the militia will not be disbanded, but has he really obtained such guarantees? This is an important point of the agreement that is not made explicit: what is the fate of these men? They will “return to their bases,” Prigozhin said. It’s unclear.
It seems that Prigozhin quickly began to look for a way out on Saturday: either that the success of his plan scared him himself, with the rapid advance of his columns; or, if he was really trying to take power, he appeared totally isolated, without support in the elite.
In various ways, from what I have seen and heard. On Saturday, there was a real moment of excitement, quite unusual, all the way to Moscow. Things are already settling (…). That said, the range of opinions is wide. Among those who are against the war, should we rejoice in this moment of chaos or worry about the future of the country? The sympathy for the men of the Wagner Group shown in Rostov-on-Don by part of the crowd also raises questions. (…)
The mode of operation of Putin’s Russia is a permanent mixture of shows of force and behind-the-scenes arrangements. Something very Byzantine, in short. From there, the fact that the leader turns into an arbiter is not in itself a sign of weakness. This is a position that Putin likes, by the way.
The situation of the last two days, however, is a little different. First, it is precisely this position of silent arbiter, withdrawn, that made the crisis take on such importance. To put it simply, the president let his defense minister and friend Sergei Shoigu be publicly called a “bitch” on several occasions. What is Yevgeny Prigozhin supposed to think? What are the other members of the elite supposed to think, who expect the leader, first and foremost, to protect against outsiders?
Finally, on Saturday, he agreed to put himself forward and dramatize the situation. “Civil war”, “traitors”… We no longer spoke of an internal conflict within the elite, but of a direct questioning of its authority (how else to call the rise towards Moscow of four columns which shot down helicopters on their route?). He accepted it as such, drawing a parallel with the 1917 revolution. Then, his army showed itself unable to resolve the situation, which constitutes a humiliation for the army, but also for its commander-in-chief. And it was ultimately him, Vladimir Putin, who had to offer guarantees to the mutineer. All after promising her “inevitable punishment”.
Again, talking about a weakening of Vladimir Putin does not mean that his regime is falling. I do not believe that you can find in the archives of the last twenty years a moment when we would have allowed ourselves to announce the collapse of this power, which remains very strong. However:– on Saturday, that power did falter;– Mr. Putin was able to maneuver to salvage the essentials, yes, and some of the elite and his people will be grateful to him;– the case will leave scars. traces: the scope of what is possible in Russia has just expanded dizzily.
All these questions are major, but, once again, they come up against the fact that we do not know enough what the agreement concluded on Saturday provides, how each party understood it and plans to respect it. It seems hardly conceivable that the Wagner Group would continue its activities as if nothing had happened (and that Yevgueni Prigojine would only suffer a simple exile), but we do not know the content of the agreement and the balance of power on which it was concluded. Who imagined that the columns of the Wagner Group (we are talking about a thousand vehicles) would come within 200 or 300 kilometers of Moscow? The Kremlin may not be, or not yet, able to fully dictate its terms.
This is also a major question. I didn’t have time to look at it in detail, but it seems that the Ukrainians were only partially able to exploit the situation. There is talk of progress in Bakhmout and perhaps of operations on the left bank of the Dnieper, in the Kherson region.
There is another mysterious point for me, and important: among the recurring messages of Yevgeny Prigozhin in recent weeks, there is this reproach made to the army that it is lying about the seriousness for Moscow of the Ukrainian counter-offensive . When it comes to casualties (he mentions a thousand soldiers killed, wounded, missing or refusing to fight per day), this may be true; but when it comes to Ukraine’s progress, that doesn’t quite match what outside observers are seeing.
It is difficult to fathom the souls of all citizens of the Russian Federation, especially in its most remote territories, but I do not believe that there are currently any serious independence movements. There are, in the fringe of opinion that rejects the war, people who feel that their region (especially the so-called “ethnic” republics) pays an unjustified tribute to this conflict which, moreover, has not no place to be.
The central government is very cautious in the face of this possible risk. On the one hand, he has in recent years promoted the “Russian” (in the ethnic sense) and Orthodox identity of the federation; on the other, he heals sensibilities and never ceases to praise “heroes” from national minorities.
As far as the elites are concerned, there is no movement in this direction. On Saturday, it was the Akhmad battalion, led from Grozny and composed largely of Chechens, that the central power deemed the most prudent to send in the direction of Rostov-on-the-Don.
When it comes to Alexander Lukashenko, his role should not be overstated. Several Russian sources explain that he was asked by the presidential administration, the Kremlin, to offer a face to Prigozhin in the negotiations, while the latter wanted to speak to Putin directly. Of course, the two have known each other for a long time.
Anything can happen, including a “real” coup, that’s one of the lessons of the weekend. However, to believe that elections can play a role in this process would be a mistake. At best, they would serve as a method of legitimizing or confirming an established fact, as is the case today.
It’s a good question because it sums up the way Russians see, or rather don’t want to see, things. No, many do not make the connection, precisely. They want to remain mere observers: because meddling in these things – “politics” yesterday -, war today – is useless, dangerous, dirty… And so many claim the right not to ask questions. , to batten down the hatches, to take refuge in blind trust in the president, to draw no logical connection… Yesterday, a woman told me of her relief: “The main thing is that peace has returned!” Yes, Russians, Russians are able to forget that their country is still at war, Monday morning.
