For a long time, Tunisia was considered a role model for democratic transformation in the Arab world. Now the country is voting on a draft constitution that could pave the way to a dictatorial regime.
This Monday, Tunisian President Kais Saied has called on the Tunisians to vote on a new constitution in a referendum. The founding day of the Tunisian republic will also mark one of the most memorable events in recent Tunisian history: a year ago, Saied suspended parliament and summarily dismissed the prime minister and his government. In the months that followed, the Tunisian President, who now ruled alone by decree, not only gradually dissolved the separation of powers.
Saied also dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council and Parliament, sacked dozens of judges and suspended the 2014 constitution that had been hailed as a milestone for the Arab world. For a long time, Tunisia was considered a role model for a democratic transformation that became the starting point for the revolutions and uprisings in the Arab world from 2011 onwards. The setbacks and breaks in Tunisia’s lighthouse narrative that followed the euphoria will no longer be able to be ignored after July 25 at the latest.
The president’s drastic step last summer came at the right time for many, and he was euphorically celebrated on Tunisia’s streets for his determination. Not only had the country long been in a deep economic and financial crisis that everyone could feel, and which had been exacerbated by the consequences of the pandemic. A majority of Tunisians recently saw their country in a hopeless impasse, particularly in terms of domestic politics. Most recently, many only equated its democratic legacy with a political class notorious for being corrupt, whose frightening inability to act became particularly clear during the dramatic weeks of the pandemic.
Since the surprise election of the political newcomer in October 2019, Saied’s program has inspired large sections of the population, especially young people. He announced a fight against corruption and the political elites as its supposed originators, as well as a political in-depth reform for more direct democracy, packaged in the language and symbolic actionism of populism to appeal to voters. Few of his critics got through with their concerns about an authoritarian drift in the Saied system. The lack of the hoped-for democratic dividend clearly put enormous pressure on the young Tunisian democracy to succeed and deliver in the form of economic decline and disenchantment with politics. Some of the population had succumbed to a nostalgic longing for the stability of the years before 2011 under the authoritarian rule of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.
On Monday the Tunisians are to vote in a referendum on the draft constitution, which Kais Saied only presented to the public on June 30th. Only a few days later, the President spoke again and presented a corrected version of his draft constitution. Even if the changes were less of a substantive nature than word corrections, for many critics in the country this is further evidence that not only the way the referendum was carried out is questionable, but also the draft itself: the draft constitution contains many, and rightly so elements criticized in Tunisia as backward and anti-democratic. Significantly, the head of the draft commission appointed by the president publicly distanced himself from it after the text was published. The draft has “in no way” anything to do with the version presented by the Commission. Instead, he attested to the draft’s “considerable risks and shortcomings” with the possibility of “paving the way to a dictatorial regime.”
In fact, the design is entirely presidential. Presidential, parliamentary and local elections are to continue. But the draft envisages a presidential system, with no major restrictions or accountability. Checks and balances: none. The president alone appoints the government and can dismiss it at any time. He can also dissolve the legislature, which is now to consist of two chambers – instead of one – without it being clear how these will work together and what involvement the new chamber of “regions and provinces” is supposed to take on. He can submit legislative proposals without the participation of others; in the case of budgetary laws, for example, he alone is entitled to do so. Although his term of office is limited to two five-year periods, this can also be extended in exceptional cases.
The separation of powers with the judiciary has also been abolished. It is true that the constitutional court provided for in the 2014 constitution never came into being, since the parliament had not been able to nominate the constitutional judges before it was dissolved. In the current draft, however, the constitutional court clearly loses powers; its cast also changes. With this, the President appoints every single judge in the country.
The basic freedoms of the 2014 constitution remain largely in place. It is not only here, however, that the draft often refers to the simple law, for example in the specific task designation of the Supreme Judicial Council or the municipalities. The details are therefore (still) unclear, much remains vague; citizens largely do not know what they are voting on. Unlike before, there is neither an anti-corruption authority nor a human rights commission.
Finally, the draft also raises the question of what role Islam should play in the state. Previously, the religion of the Tunisian state was Islam. The draft now stipulates that “the state alone must strive to achieve the goals of Islam within the framework of a democratic system”. What this means in practical terms remains uncertain, but the revision of the religion article caused astonishment, since Saied was previously considered an advocate of secularism and a staunch opponent of Islamism.
But in addition to the content of the draft, the constitutional process is also criticized. The referendum expressly contradicts the current constitution, which provides for the participation of parliament and the constitutional court in constitutional amendments. The process, in its relatively short time, was neither inclusive nor sufficiently participatory. The President even prevented a public discussion.
Even if in the course of the year-long consolidation of power in Saied little resistance has been formed by political parties, civil society and the population as a whole and Saied’s constitutional experiment has benefited less from its own prospects of success and more from the collective negative experience of democracy and the mobilization problems of opposition forces: Ahead of the referendum that Saied wants to use to legitimize his “new republic,” Tunisia is increasingly divided.
President Saied had already held an online referendum in the spring in order to demonstrate dialogue with the people and a participatory approach in preparation for the upcoming referendum. Tunisian turnout, however, was sobering, with only around seven percent of the voting population. Even if a significantly higher turnout is to be expected this time – which current surveys are now assuming – the country is facing a crucial test. A national dialogue involving all actors will be necessary in the long term, not only in the case of weak participation, in order to avoid destabilizing Tunisia.
By now, at the latest, many in Tunisia have realized that the draft constitution and referendum have halted the country’s democratic transformation for the time being. The overdue reforms, the restructuring of the state budget and economy and thus a long-term improvement in the living conditions of many Tunisians seem to be a long way off. The new constitution hardly addresses these issues. This could quickly cause the new system under Kais Saied to have difficulties in explaining itself, should it – like the previous governments – not be able to deliver in the end.
The systematic dismantling of democratic achievements not only paved the way to a presidential-autocratic system of government, but also confirmed skeptics about the feasibility of democracy throughout the Arab world. With the current developments, Tunisia is threatened with further potential for conflict. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, July 25 promises to be a black day for Tunisian democracy, its remaining supporters in Tunisia, and its former admirers in the region and in Europe.
Philipp Bremer is head of the rule of law program for the Middle East and North Africa at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS). Malte Gaier is head of the KAS office in Tunisia.
(This article was first published on Saturday, July 23, 2022.)
