After France and the soldiers of Operation “Barkhane”, it is the turn of Minusma and its blue helmets to be ordered to leave Mali by the transitional authorities. Friday, June 16, before the United Nations Security Council, the head of Malian diplomacy, Abdoulaye Diop, asked, on behalf of his government, “the immediate withdrawal of Minusma”. While Bamako’s demand is expected to take some time to be carried out, if only for logistical reasons, the door is now open for the departure of the approximately 15,000 UN soldiers, police and civilian personnel deployed in Mali. since 2013. For Rahmane Idrissa, political science researcher at the African Studies Center at Leiden University (Netherlands), the junta’s decision puts an end to a UN mission that will never have was able to enforce his mandate and be accepted by Bamako.
The fact that the government of Mali is calling for the departure of Minusma is not surprising in itself, but the vigor of this demand and its prompt nature denote hostility from the transitional authorities, which can be linked to the publication of the report on Moura [in which the UN accuses the Malian army and “foreign military personnel”, identified by witnesses and NGOs as mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group, of executing at least 500 people in March 2022] . I don’t really see any other reason than that.
The blue helmets’ mission had become impossible. Over the period 2013-2016, the Minusma had realistic means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians in northern Mali and to help with the institutional strengthening of the Malian state. But from 2016, when the security situation deteriorated, in particular with the extension of violence in central Mali and then with the series of coups d’etat, which was accompanied by the departure of French soldiers and European countries with which it had a certain synergy in its operations, its means were not adapted to the new context.
For example, Minusma’s mission is to support the return to constitutional order, but today in Mali, we are in a transitional military regime that is continuing. It was also supposed to help restore peace through the application of the peace and reconciliation agreements signed in Algiers, but the implementation of these agreements is frozen. The mission was at a crossroads. She was looking for a new path and, in the meantime, could be used as an outlet for some frustrations in Mali.
I don’t think it will have any significant consequences. The actions that the Minusma still carries out inside the country are increasingly constrained, partly because of the obstacles imposed on it by the government of Mali. Minusma, today, is a lot of money spent for little results. It should be noted, however, that civilians will be more exposed and less protected in war zones. Economically, as for “Barkhane”, this departure will worsen the situation of the populations in the north who could depend on his projects. But on the general diplomatic level, I do not see any major consequence, because the current geopolitical climate leaves the Malian government significant leeway.
The deterrent capacity of the Minusma is limited. If there was really a will to do battle on one side or the other, it could not intervene. Moreover, the Minusma was itself seeking to obtain a kind of legitimacy from its presence in Mali; and therefore opposing the government head-on, if it wanted to carry out operations in the north against the Coordination of Azawad Movements, would not be the best way to achieve this result. That said, I do not see a real will of the Malian government, for the moment, to do battle with the irredentists of the north.
This situation may benefit Russia, but I do not have the impression that the reorientation desired by the Malian government actually benefits Mali. The direct consequence of this is that it has become difficult to set up a partnership between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, the three countries in the region on the front line to confront jihadist movements. Today, the option taken by Bamako and Ouagadougou – which welcomed the Malian decision – prevents the functioning of this partnership. This was already the case before the departure of Minusma, but this only confirms this very negative sequence for the region, while it is impossible to put an end to these jihadist insurgencies if the three countries do not put establishment of collective security structures.
I don’t know if the colonels need to send the Minusma out to achieve this. Being in Bamako recently, I understood that the Minusma encouraged people to go and vote for the constitutional referendum, the result of which it is sure will be a massive “yes”. Much in this Constitution seems to indicate that people who are in power now will be able to run for office afterwards; and by running for office while in power, there is a good chance they will win. So far, the Minusma did not object to this. I therefore do not see what the Malian authorities gain by sending the Minusma out. I think that the soldiers could very well achieve their ends without making the Minusma leave.