In the years 2009-2010, it was believed that the countries of the Sahel, led by Mali, had found a democratic path to economic development. But the jihadist groups that invaded northern Mali in the spring of 2012 tragically revealed the profound fragility of this state and, by contagion, of its neighbours. Ten years after the launch of the French army’s intervention and Operation Serval hailed as a military and political success, the situation has never stopped deteriorating in the Sahel. In his book investigates Mali-Sahel, our Afghanistan to us? (Impact Editions, 147 pages, 15 euros) journalist and specialist in the Sahel Seidik Abba draws an instructive analogy with Afghanistan. Indeed, in the opinion of many experts, the security prism can no longer be the only relevant one to understand the deterioration of the situation in the region over the past ten years. For Seidick Abba, the military response cannot be a substitute for the political, economic and social responses necessary to emerge from a deep crisis. Especially since, opposite, certain jihadist groups have undergone their transformation, creating enemies from within, a fact that complicates the terrorist equation. To better share how much it is necessary to take into account the changes made in the field, Seidik Abba agreed to answer questions from Point Afrique.
Le Point Afrique: What concrete elements led you to affirm that Mali and the Sahel can be to France what Afghanistan was to the United States?
Seidik Abba: Many observers dispute this analogy given the cultural, historical and geographical differences. However, I noticed some big similarities. In Afghanistan as in the Sahel, the objectives set at the start have not been achieved. On the American side, in 2001, the United States was determined to oust the Taliban from power and prevent the country from becoming a sanctuary for jihadists. Twenty years later, it’s a failure. When the Americans left Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban returned to power and the country is still a terrorist stronghold, as al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul in July 2022.
On the French side, if the Serval operation launched in January 2013 by François Hollande is analyzed as a military and political success, Barkhane, who took over in 2014, with, this time, the ambition to eradicate terrorism in the Sahel, is a failure. The terrorist threat has gained ground and has been exported mainly to Burkina Faso and Niger. But the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin and Togo, are also threatened.
Another element of comparison, and not the least important, is the fact that the Afghan Taliban have always had a local agenda. Their ambition was really to reconquer Afghanistan. Their strategy has never been to send fighters to attack France, Germany or even England on the model of the Islamic State. The international agenda did not interest them.
The same thing is happening in the Sahel where jihadist groups have their local agenda. It is not for nothing that when the United States decided to leave Afghanistan, the group for the support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), of Iyad Ag Ghali, issued a statement of congratulations to the home of the Taliban, “brothers” who defeated the greatest army in the world. This departure galvanized them.
In the Sahel too, aid has not been effective at all. In Mali, for example under IBK, between 2012 and 2017, about 1 billion euros of public aid was diverted according to a Canadian study. In Niger, there was the scandal of the Ministry of Defence. In all the countries of the Sahel, the security situation has created niches that have favored the diversion of public aid. There was no synergy between the stakeholders. After ten years, the overwhelming impression is that nothing has been done.
These are all elements of convergence between the Taliban and the terrorist groups of the Sahel – apart from the Islamic State – which make me say that we are dealing with the Sahelian Taliban.
How do you explain, today, the rivalries which are exploding in broad daylight between terrorist groups in the Sahel and which are making populations the first victims of terrorism, unlike in Afghanistan?
In Afghanistan, there are only the Taliban, although the Islamic State no longer hesitates to launch attacks. This is a change that is interesting to observe because the rivalry is very strong in the Sahel, where two major brands are tearing each other apart. First, the support group for Islam and Muslims, created in 2017 by the merger of several factions, including Ansar Dine of Ghali, Ansarul Islam, Al-Mourabitoune of the late Mokhtar Belmokhtar, katiba Serma, katiba Macina of Amadoun Koufa and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqmi), under the banner of Iyad Ag Ghali, Tuareg leader of Mali.
Opposite, we have the great rival, which is the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS). The latter infiltrated Africa after the disintegration of Libya. Then, it strengthened its Sahelian footprint and is now present in the area of ??the three borders, between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
At the beginning, these groups were organized with a precise territorial distribution. It was the only part of the world where there was a tacit agreement between two major terrorist organizations.
Journalist, specialist in the Sahel, and essayist, Seidik abba also directs the International Center for Reflections and Studies on the Sahel which has just been created. © Vincent Fournier / JA
A recent video by jihadist leader Iyad Ag Ghali confirms that al-Qaeda is expanding into southern Mali. How should this appearance be analyzed? What importance does it take on in the context of this open war between the two terrorist groups?
Iyad Ag Ghali had not appeared publicly since the release of French hostage Sophie Pétronin and Malian hostage Soumaïla Cissé. He wants to demonstrate that he can go where he wants, and move more easily with the departure of the French soldiers, of whom he was the number one target. There is also in him a desire to mark his status as protector of civilian populations, in particular Tuareg communities and their territory against IS, which launched an offensive on the ground last March.
But this public appearance of Iyad Ag Ghali, surrounded by notables from the Ménaka region swearing allegiance to him, is also part of an acceleration of the endogenization underway within the terrorist groups present in the Sahel. That is to say, it is the Sahelians, themselves, who take the lead. And Iyad Ag Ghali was chosen for that purpose with Amadoun Koufa as number two. In this, too, GSIM differs from its great enemy, ISIS, most of whose leaders come from other parts of the world.
It is certainly a colossal challenge for the State. However, can this appearance allow the Malian army to overcome the Islamic State with which it has always refused to negotiate?
This appearance gives the feeling that Mali does not have total control of the territory, contrary to what has been advanced in recent months, especially since the arrival of the Russian partner and Wagner. While in Bamako we celebrated the sovereignty of Mali, on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the Malian Armed Forces (Fama), Iyad Ag Ghali appeared in Ménaka, this proves that the jihadists can still move without the Malian authorities being able to crack down .
Paradoxically, the local chiefs’ alliance with Iyad Ag Ghali also aims to weaken ISIS in the Greater Sahara, and the Malian authorities can take advantage of this competition. The junta will not go so far as to affiliate with Iyad Ag Ghali to fight ISIS, but he has become, in a way, an objective ally of the Malian state. It is obvious that the fratricidal confrontation between the two groups weakens them mutually, which could in the long term benefit the power.
What do the notables of the Ménaka region expect from Iyad Ag Ghali?
It was the need for protection that brought in local leaders, including General El Hadj Gamou, a historical enemy of Ghali within the Tuareg community. He’s one of them, and he seems more capable of protecting them. For them and the populations, it also has more legitimacy in the face of the violence perpetrated by IS.
How much does the endogenization of jihadist groups complicate the terrorism equation in the Sahel?
Since the appearance of terrorism in the Sahel, the leaders of katiba and even the fighters came mainly from the Maghreb, from Algeria for some, from Tunisia for others, from Western Sahara, a little also from Mauritania. It was later that these terrorist groups decided to recruit locals from the base up to the command. There are now Fulani, Songhai, Tuareg, Malian Sarakole, Zarma, Hausa, etc.
How did they get there?
The terrorists have found a favorable breeding ground there, since the young people in these regions have no activity or perspective. Several areas are bearing the brunt of the effects of climate change. There is no development and the state is absent. Opposite, these jihadist groups have deployed significant financial resources, thanks in particular to the payment of the ransoms they collect and the various traffics.
To solve the equation, we will have to find solutions other than armed force. In any event, the lessons of the failure of Western intervention in Afghanistan must imperatively be taken into account. Sahelian governments must rebuild their sovereign apparatus, meet the development needs of populations, establish justice, etc.
We also observe that since the withdrawal of the French army, the jihadist groups do not hesitate to communicate on the alleged abuses of the army and their auxiliaries of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner against civilians. In the end, does the “informational struggle” that is being played out between Wagner and France in Africa not risk distracting from the real problems on the ground?
In West Africa, Wagner is surfing on a context, which is that of the disappointment of several African public opinions with regard to the relationship with France. According to my own research on the ground, in these countries, the populations are rather disappointed with the absence of results on the military front. In some villages, they see the French soldiers pass without seeing the situation change. They feel excluded. In public opinion, this discontent was transformed with the idea that with Wagner the war was already won in advance.
It is an illusion to believe that Wagner or Russia alone will solve the Sahelian crisis. The solution goes beyond security and military. The response must be holistic, i.e. Sahelian governments must focus on both military and security efforts to stabilize, socio-economic development to reduce the breeding ground for recruitment and at the same time ensure the return of the State, good governance, reuniting communities, without forgetting to guarantee the end of impunity.
The same scenario seems to be taking shape in Burkina Faso. Do you think that, like Bamako, Ouagadougou will go through with the break with France and welcome Wagner’s group of Russian militiamen or do you think that, on the contrary, Burkina will remain in a more cautious approach?
Since its independence, Burkina Faso has always been reluctant to any external military presence on its soil, this is explained by its socio-political history. We talk about the country of “Men of Integrity”, and truly the legacy of Thomas Sankara lives on. The country is the only one to officially use VDPs, these civilian volunteers, who support the security and defense forces. It was not until 2018 that the military cooperation agreements with France were signed which led to the installation of Saber soldiers at Camp Kamboinsin, under the presidency of former President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, in because of the deterioration of the security context.
After two coups, this is a golden opportunity for Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s regime to assert its sovereignty, particularly in terms of defence. Thus, it responds to a request from part of the Burkinabè public which considers that cooperation with France does not give satisfaction. The wind of sovereignty blowing from Bamako to other Sahelian countries has also changed the situation. However, Ouagadougou is in a different process.
The power seems to me to be very cautious about bringing in Wagner. In Mali, some of the officials trained in the former USSR were ready to sever all bilateral relations with France and cared little for their immediate ECOWAS neighbours. In Burkina Faso, the junta is very careful about the reactions of a country like Côte d’Ivoire, with which there are very strong historical, economic and social ties. The junta would also not want to fall out with Ghana, President Akufo-Addo has displayed his hostility to seeing Wagner disembark.