It’s called an offensive, but it doesn’t look like it: military expert Gustav Gressel from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) explains to ntv.de why Russia is attacking in such a cautious and fragmented manner – and why the Ukrainians should still not launch a counterattack now.
ntv.de: Russia is on the offensive, but it doesn’t look very offensive.
Gustav Gressel: From a military point of view, what the Russians are doing right now is ineffective. When I think of Soviet theories about breakthrough attacks, they looked very different. From the Red Army’s point of view back then, during the Cold War, the success of an attack was based on massing the troops in one place, and that’s where the emphasis is clearly placed. (Gressel pulls out a book on Soviet military strategy and shows sketches to the camera.) You pull together strong forces, develop artillery fire superiority, then you break through massively and go deep. The aim is to push as far as possible into the enemy’s depths.
So the opposite of attack on a broad front?
Narrow and deep to force the enemy to give up terrain and retreat or get caught from the flank. The Russian problem is: that’s exactly what we don’t see now.
What happens at the front instead?
The Russians are attacking along the front line in many separate axes, but always in small fragments. A battalion here, one there, if it gets high, it’s three together. But of course they can be warded off better on such a small scale, the chances of success are much worse than they would be with a massive breakthrough.
Why don’t the Russians do this?
That’s the exciting question. Mainly because the entire Russian literature is full of the idea that you should do it this way.
What is your theory?
In my view, this is the result of their mobilization. The current Russian army is not a mobilization army compared to the former Red Army or that of the Tsar. You don’t have reserve divisions. There are no staffs, no reserve officers, and there are not enough people who could lead a major offensive.
How challenging would that be?
If I had to fight such a breakthrough battle, the first thing I would do would be to concentrate the forces, and that would have to take place in an area out of range of the HIMARS missiles. Otherwise the Ukrainians will shoot it up before I even reach the front. The next important thing: Not everyone can march in single file in a row. I have to make sure that the troops drive up to the front on different roads and at different times, attack there and then push through further. But for that I need experienced officers who can coordinate this in the units.
A year ago, around Kiev, the advancing Russian columns looked like they were stuck in a traffic jam after work.
It actually didn’t work out that well back then. However, now that so many Russian officers have fallen that they have to work with inexperienced recruits, it would work even less now. For comparison: in a normal reserve battalion, the people have known each other for ten years, have practiced together many times, are able to assess what they can and cannot do. In the mobilized Russian battalions, on the other hand, there are people lumped together who have never met before and who have only just been trained enough to have a chance of surviving in combat. They don’t do combined arms combat. That is why Russia is currently opting for small-scale offensives. They’re easier to coordinate.
How do the reserves get to the troops?
The Russians take a regiment from the front, often send it to areas near the border, refresh it there with new recruits, and then transfer it back to the front. Take it out – refresh it – move it back, but I can only do that bit by bit because I can only release a certain part of the squad at a time. Therefore, this offensive is not proceeding like previous Red Army offensives, when the gates opened in World War II, and suddenly newly formed divisions and corps broke through, surprising the Wehrmacht and wreaking havoc.
So instead of breaking through with mass, growing bit by bit. But at some point there are still many. So it won’t remain manageable for Ukraine?
This is already visible, the Russian attacks are increasing every day. On satellite images from last week, we can see that new units are arriving, for example over Rostov, and the quantity is increasing. It’s getting harder and harder for the Ukrainians to fend off all this and defend their territory. You can see in Bachmut how tough and extremely difficult the fights are.
And great losses for Ukraine?
Ukraine defends very well. But for many counterattacks in recent weeks, in order not to let Bachmut fall and to push the Russians away from their supply lines, they have used special forces. These were their most war-experienced people, old cadres who had already taken part in the Donbass. In other words: the most important forces in the whole army, and they wear out. It also costs material. From a Russian point of view, it says: “We can’t break through, it’s not elegant either, and we’ve had a lot of casualties, but at the end of the day the wear and tear ratio speaks for us. Ukraine is defending very well and we Russians are losing a lot of soldiers, but the Ukrainians too, and they can’t hold out as long as we can.”
And when Putin looks at his high weekly loss numbers, does he still tick it?
This is an enormously cynical calculation, but yes. He thinks: “After a year or two of war, it will still pay off for me, because then Ukraine will be finished and the West will no longer be interested.”
That means the tide must turn.
Yes, but not yet. Because many measures taken by the West will only take effect in the course of the year. Only in the second half of the year will we really have many Leopard tanks available. The ammunition is similar. Production halls are being built, production lines are being set up, but it will also be summer before deliveries are at the level where we want them to be. From my point of view, the situation for the Ukrainians will then be much easier. But they have to bridge the time until then. That’s going to be hard.
So you’re currently advising against an offensive?
It would be feasible, but the cost/benefit calculation would not be good. First, the Ukrainians would have to pull out mechanized reserves along the front lines to throw them into this offensive. This would weaken their defensive forces and make them more vulnerable. Secondly, the Russians have dug many minefields and anti-tank ditches in their own depths in order to be able to continue to defend against a Ukrainian breakthrough. They would always successfully stop the Ukrainian offensive and they would have to start all over again. That would be costly and costly.
So for Ukraine it’s a matter of holding out and waiting for western weapons.
Another argument speaks in favor of this: If we now fast-forward the time a bit, we have the following development: The Russians as attackers have higher losses than the Ukrainian defense.
Is that basically the case? Attack costs more than defense?
Exactly. So the Russians will come to the point where they have used up their new reserves. Then they, in turn, have to pull troops for the offensives out of front sections where little is going on. These sections are weakened, the Russians are gradually weakening their front sections.
You can roughly guess what the Ukrainians are doing now.
Of course, the Ukrainians follow along and say: “It’s getting thin here.” And then they go right into that weakness with a counteroffensive. The Russian side can hardly react to this because they lack the reserves. If I were Ukraine’s supreme commander, I would bid time now and say, “I’ll have a much better impact later in the year with the same forces, with the same casualties.”
Your word in the ear of the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief.
The impatience of the West is of course difficult to predict. If he says, “We’ll send you the tanks, now we want to see something too” – because you want to show something for some reason, that can put pressure on Ukraine. But if I were in the American or German government, I would just let the topic of counter-offensives rest for a while.
Frauke Niemeyer spoke to Gustav Gressel
