Who, rebel movements or loyalist forces, will be the first to pronounce the death certificate of the Algiers peace and reconciliation agreement signed in 2015 by the Tuareg and Arab independence movements and the Malian state? The ceasefire, which floated in an ocean of mistrust between the two parties, has been seriously damaged in recent weeks, raising fears of a widespread resumption of clashes.

The latest fighting between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA, a grouping of the main rebel groups signatories to the Algiers Agreement) and the Malian armed forces (FAMa) took place on September 17 in Léré, southeast of Timbuktu, near the border with Mauritania. CMA fighters briefly occupied this Malian army base.

“They took the FAMa by surprise and made them flee, seizing weapons and military equipment along the way before withdrawing in good order,” reports a Tuareg dignitary, member of another group, reached by telephone. . The CMA claimed to have shot down, during the fighting, an Albatros L-39 fighter plane, one of those supplied at the beginning of the year to Bamako by the Russian Federation.

Five days earlier, the rebels had attacked another Malian army camp in Bourem. This strategic city for the belligerents is located on an east-west transverse axis linking Timbuktu to Gao, and at the crossroads of access routes leading to Kidal, sanctuary of the Tuareg rebellions which, in 2012, proclaimed the independence of Azawad on northern Mali. Other fighting, in this same area, also took place in mid-August for control of the Ber base.

The awakening of warlike ardor

“The challenge is to occupy the land after the departure of Minusma [which the ruling junta asked in June to leave the country within six months],” adds the aforementioned official. The mandate of the UN mission aimed to support the implementation of the Algiers agreement, as well as to protect civilian populations and facilitate the restoration of State authority throughout the territory. If none of these objectives were achieved in ten years of presence, the deployment of blue helmets as well as UN diplomatic activity had made it possible to keep the different parties at a distance. Failing to make progress towards a lasting solution to the crisis.

The process of monitoring the peace agreement had in fact been paralyzed since the military coup in Bamako in August 2020. But the withdrawal, two years later, of the French anti-terrorist operation “Barkhane” then of Minusma has, it seems, awakened warlike ardor. “The parties [signatories of Algiers] adopted divergent positions on the fate of the camps liberated by the mission,” recalled on August 28, before the UN Security Council, El Ghassim Wane, the special representative of the international organization for Mali.

The junta intends to retake all Minusma camps after their evacuation. “The CMA, in particular, is opposed to the deployment of Malian armed forces in the areas it controls,” added the Mauritanian diplomat who was concerned about “the serious deficit of trust between the parties.”

However, Minusma has only just completed, on August 30, the first phase of its withdrawal by leaving four of its bases: Ménaka, Ogossagou, Ber, Goundam. Across the country, the UN must resolve a real logistical challenge in six months: repatriating 12,947 uniformed personnel, separating 1,786 civilian personnel, reshipping 5,500 sea containers of equipment and nearly 4,000 vehicles , according to its accounting. The United Nations must still close nine bases, among the most sensitive in political and security terms, because they are located in the strongholds of rebel movements.

“We are being forced to go to war.”

These include the military camps of Tessalit, Aguelhok and Kidal, in northern Mali, the same area from which the rebellion movement that almost imploded the Malian state started in 2012. “We will not let go of these camps,” warned a CMA member reached by telephone in the Gao area. Even if it means forging alliances of circumstance with the jihadists of the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM, or JNIM in Arabic) affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

“The junta treats us like terrorists, it has driven the international community out of the country [Minusma and the French operation “Barkhane”, in 2022] and refuses foreign mediation. There is no more dialogue, so we are forced to go to war,” explains a member of the CMA. “For the CMA, all means are good to protect Kidal, even joining forces with JNIM terrorists,” denounces a Tuareg official who still hopes for a relaunch of dialogue with Bamako.

In 2012, the Tuareg and Arab independence movements were completely overwhelmed by jihadist groups, which are still the most active today. On September 7, the GSIM claimed responsibility for a deadly double attack, in the Timbuktu region, against a passenger boat sailing on the Niger River, and an army base in Bamba. According to an official report, 49 civilians and 15 soldiers were killed. For a month, this same group has also subjected the city of Timbuktu to a blockade.

As for the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS), for lack of military pressure, it continues to progress. “EIGS has taken control of large parts of the Ménaka region [in eastern Niger] as well as a number of towns,” observes the Center for Strategic Studies of Africa (CESA ). “The junta has ceded its authority over significant parts of northern Mali,” added this think tank attached to the American Department of Defense in a note dated July 21. For the CESA, if nothing changes, “the prospect of the collapse of Mali [is] more and more likely”.